INTRA AFRICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF MOTIVE AND IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S QUIET DIPLOMACY ON THE ZIMBABWEAN CRISIS FROM 2000 TO 2013

BY

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B1025286

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION (BUSE) IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (MSC IR) DEGREE QUALIFICATION

BINDURA, ZIMBABWE

2014
BINDURA UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE EDUCATION

APPROVAL FORM

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I declare that “Intra African Relations: An Analysis of Motive and Impact of South Africa’s Quiet Diplomacy on the Zimbabwean Crisis from 2000 to 2013” is my own work; that it has not been submitted before any degree or examination in any other university; and that all the sources quoted in this document have been indicated and acknowledged as complete references.

Allan Ricky Gwata _______________________________ ________________
                  Signature                             Date
DEDICATION

I dedicate the dissertation to my family; Nancy and Tawananyasha. They are my source of inspiration who gave me the impetus to go on even when the going got tough. My wife always reminded me to stay focused and she understood my absence from home whilst working on this document.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my utmost gratitude to the Lord by giving me the gift of life and letting me live this long to see the project to completion. I am grateful to my family for encouraging me to pursue this programme.

Furthermore, to my supervisor Mr Mahuku and Mr Mbanje, I would like to overly thank you for your guidance that ensured that I reached thus far. If it were not for your priceless effort, I would not have managed to complete the dissertation. Mr Banda and Mr Makwerere, I hail your contributions.

To my friend, colleague and younger brother Tapiwa ‘Taps’ Gutura, I cherished the moments that we had together. I drew inspiration from you. You are a marvel young man. Keep it up, the sky is the limit for you.

Finally, to all my colleagues, thank you for the time and ideas that we shared during our time.

Thank you all.

May the Lord richly bless you.
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<td>AU</td>
<td>African Union</td>
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<td>BSACo</td>
<td>British South Africa Company</td>
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<td>BUSE</td>
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<td>CCJP</td>
<td>Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace</td>
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<td>Congress of South African Trade Unions</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
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<td>Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition</td>
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<td>DA</td>
<td>Democratic Alliance</td>
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<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>Economic Structural Adjustment Programme</td>
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<td>Fast Track Land Reform Programme</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
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<td>GNU</td>
<td>Government of National Unity</td>
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<td>HIV and AIDS</td>
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<td>Multi National Corporation</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
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<td>New Partnership for Africa’s Economic Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>PAC</td>
<td>Pan Africanist Congress</td>
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SACP    South African Communist Party
SADC    Southern African Development Committee
SAPS    South African Police Services
UK      United Kingdom
UN      United Nations
USA     United States of America
UZ      University of Zimbabwe
WB      World Bank
ZANLA   Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army
ZANU (PF) Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front)
ZCTU    Zimbabwe Congress for Trade Unions
ZESN    Zimbabwe Election Support Network
ZIMSTATS Zimbabwe Statistical Services
ZIMTA   Zimbabwe Teachers Association
ZIPRA   Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army
ZUM     Zimbabwe Unity Movement
ABSTRACT

The research sought to analyse the motive and impact of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy on the Zimbabwean crisis from 2000 to 2013. Zimbabwe has been experiencing both political and economical upheavals from 2013 which were attributed to variables like economic mismanagement, the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, political intolerance, and sanctions. These have had a significant impact on the livelihoods of Zimbabwean citizens.

South Africa was tasked to resolve the political impasse that had resulted in Zimbabwe as a result of the political polarization that resulted from the political intolerance. Conspicuously, South Africa under Thabo Mbeki adopted quiet diplomacy – a strategy that was proven to be highly inappropriate - to resolve the crisis.

The research was guided by realism as its theoretical framework.

The study made use of triangulation as its research design. This made it possible for the researcher to employ both qualitative and quantitative data collection methods so as to minimize on the weaknesses of each approach. In this regard, questionnaires, interviews, and secondary records were employed as data gathering tools. The target population was the Zimbabwean and South African citizens. However, purposive and convenience sampling were made used of in order to come up with a total of 70 respondents. The respondents comprised of officials from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and Trade and Economic Development, South African Embassy officials, organizations from the civic society i.e. ZESN, CCJP, CZC, and the ZCTU. Academics from Bindura University and the University of Zimbabwe were also considered for the study.

The findings from the study indicated that respondents attributed South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy to a host of factors. These include the historical ties between the two countries, realism, the NEPAD initiative, and South Africa’s early experiences at conflict resolution. It was also found out that the migration of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa had political, economical, and social connotation for both nations with the most prominent ones being brain drain and xenophobia. It was also agreed that South Africa was being realistic over the Zimbabwe crisis.
because it had interests to protect and stood to benefit from its neighbour’s prolonged strife. The study also revealed that South Africa did not handle the crisis properly resulting in quiet diplomacy being discredited as a conflict resolution tool in Zimbabwe.

The study recommended that the UN/AU/SADC be heavily involved in monitoring the progress made by mediators and to ensure their impartiality.
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CHAPTER ONE

1.0 Introduction

Zimbabwe and South Africa’s relations have been very cordial despite the assumption that in international relations, there are no permanent allies, there are no permanent enemies but only permanent interests (Brown: 2002). This statement can correctly be attributed to nation state interactions. States can have strained political relations but at the same time continue to engage in economic relations because it is in their best interests to do so.

The Zimbabwe political and economic crises that ensued for more than a decade have been a cause of concern for the whole world in general, and SADC in particular. SADC was particularly concerned about the twin crises because in order for a bloc to prosper, there is need for stability within member countries. Basing on reasons of influence and proximity, South Africa was chosen to mediate in the Zimbabwe crises and emerge with lasting solutions to ensure stability of the block. South Africa chose to apply quiet diplomacy as a tool for conflict resolution. This strategy was employed for close to a decade as has brought little joy for Zimbabweans and other SADC counterparts. The research aims to outline the reason why South Africa chose that route and even resisted moves calling for it to revisit quiet diplomacy. It will also look at the implications that the strategy had on the populace of both Zimbabwe and South Africa.

1.2 Background of the Study

When Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980, the black majority government took over. This government was more sympathetic to the plight of the majority of black South Africans that were living under oppression in apartheid South Africa. During these days, South Africa also played a destabilizing role in Africa in a bid to stop other countries, specifically Zimbabwe from assisting the black South Africans’ fight for independence (Rupiya: 2002). This led to the Zimbabwe government severing diplomatic ties with the apartheid South African government in 1980 (O’Malley: 1980). Politically, Zimbabwe chose instead to align itself with the suffering masses of South Africa represented by the ANC and the PAC (Kalley: 1986). However, Zimbabwe continued to maintain economic relations with South Africa as a matter of interest since it was heavily dependent upon South Africa’s industry and sea ports for sustenance.
Zimbabwe therefore, became very instrumental in the struggle for South Africa’s independence by offering the two political parties moral and material support (Begg: 1986). South Africa eventually attained its independence in 1994. Thereafter, the political ties between the ZANU (PF) government in Zimbabwe and the newly inaugurated ANC government in South Africa were further cemented. Zimbabwe and South Africa continued to trade; with Zimbabwe becoming South Africa’s most important trading partner (Games: 2003). To date South Africa continues to dominate the Zimbabwe industry, especially in the mining sector through companies like Lonrho, Rio Tinto and the Anglo American Group. It also has vested interests in other sectors of the economy like the manufacturing, energy and service sectors (Singh: 2005). Sasol and Eskom are heavily involved in supplying Zimbabwe with petroleum products and electricity respectively.

When Zimbabwe embarked on the FTLRP partly as a ZANU (PF) political gimmick in 1999, it immediately fell prey to EU and USA’s sanctions. This resulted in a serious economic meltdown for a country that regarded agriculture as its economical epicentre. Agricultural production fell sharply as white commercial farmers were elbowed out of their farms, making way for incapacitated landless black farmers (Zikhali: 2008). The reallocated farms lay fallow as a result of the incapacitation, with an adverse effect to the economy (Masiiwa: 2005).

ZANU (PF)’s political dominance in Zimbabwe was challenged by the formation of the MDC in 1999. This was a result of the disgruntlement by the Zimbabwean workers being led by the ZCTU, students, lawyers, lecturers, etc. The MDC was against ZANU (PF)’s dictatorial tendencies and the sharp economic decline that started in 1997 after the payment war veterans gratuities (Masiiwa: 2005). The situation was further exacerbated by Zimbabwe’s participation in the DRC in 1998 and the land invasions that occurred after the ZANU (PF) referendum defeat in February 2000. Coupled with a vibrant opposition, sanctions, and a misfiring economy, Zimbabwe plunged into economic and political chaos.

Given South Africa’s economic strength, it was considered better placed to handle the Zimbabwean crisis to bring political and economic stability to its troubled neighbour. Under the tutelage of President Thabo Mbeki, South Africa ‘shied away’ from adopting a rigorous approach as the situation dictated. Mbeki chose to employ a soft power strategy known as ‘quiet diplomacy’ instead. This strategy did not involve the use of loud or megaphone diplomacy, but took place as behind the scenes negotiations between Zimbabwe’s three main political parties. He even went to
the extent of throwing a political lifeline to ZANU (PF) by advancing it with a R1 billion package, which was meant to ‘avert a total collapse of the country’ (McKinley: 2004). Despite the support, the political and economic climate in Zimbabwe continued to deteriorate. The ensuing melee in Zimbabwe resulted in economic refugees filtering in droves into South Africa and other foreign destinations. Zimbabwe’s economic dependence on South Africa was magnified as its economy further shrank. Despite all the signs that quiet diplomacy was not working, South Africa still would not take a tough stance against Zimbabwe.

Questions that arise are why did Mbeki not take a tough stance against Harare to halt Zimbabwe’s political and economic trajectory? By adopting quiet diplomacy what were his motives? What has been the impact of such an approach on Zimbabwe and South African citizens? These are areas that need to be interrogated.

Central to Mbeki’s presidency was an emphasis on an African Renaissance and its evolution, the NEPAD – a continental plan meant to take Africa from the margins of world power and diplomacy into a stronger role in global forums (Freeman: 2005).

In 2008, after contested election results marred by reports of gross human rights abuses perpetrated by the political parties, the hyperinflationary environment in Zimbabwe spiralled out of control, leading to the dumping of the worthless Zimbabwean dollar in preference of more robust currencies like the South African Rand, the United States Dollar, the British Pound, and Botswana’s Pula (the multicurrency system).

A power sharing deal between ZANU (PF) and the two MDC factions was made in September 2008 with the signing of the GPA. The GNU in Zimbabwe, that came into place in February 2009 ushered into the political fray new political players like Morgan Tsvangirai and Authur Mutambara. This hybrid government brought in a semblance of normalcy in Zimbabwe and managed to contain hyperinflation and kick started the process of industrial revival in Zimbabwe (Hartwell: 2013). However, in 2013, another contested election result accorded the ZANU (PF) government a fresh mandate to govern Zimbabwe for the next five years, with SADC and AU’s endorsement. What is worrisome is that Zimbabwe’s economy has not quickly recovered as has been anticipated by many.

1.2 Statement of the Problem
Despite cordial relations between South Africa and Zimbabwe, South Africa continues to prosper whilst Zimbabwe is arguably taking an eternity to recover from the Lowe dons crisis that gripped it from 2000 to 2013. Because of South Africa’s economic strength, it was tasked with the mandate of resolving the Zimbabwe crisis. What is intriguing and worrisome is that Zimbabwe has become a repository of South African manufactured goods whilst Zimbabwean industries have failed to recover and others are closing down. Some workers in industries are working for only one week a month, a scenario that is disturbing. When South Africa adopted quiet diplomacy on Harare, did it really want to solve the Zimbabwean problem? Furthermore, South African manufactured goods that are in many instances cheaper than locally manufactured goods now dominate the Zimbabwean market. South Africa’s industry is therefore ‘choking the little that remains of the Zimbabwe manufacturing sector. Did South Africa not have an ulterior motive in adopting a soft stance in solving the Zimbabwean problem given the notion that it continues to be a beneficiary of the Zimbabwean problem.

1.3 Aim of the Study

This study aims to explore the reasons behind South Africa’s continued use of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe and the impact this strategy has on both nations.

1.4 Objectives of the Study

The research proposes the following objectives:

✓ To discuss the reasons of South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy in resolving Zimbabwe’s political and economic challenges.
✓ To examine the effects of Zimbabwe’s instability on the economic and social livelihoods of Zimbabweans and South Africans.
✓ To assess the effectiveness of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool in Zimbabwe.

1.5 Research Questions

The study seeks to answer the following questions:
• What were the reasons for South Africa’s continued use of quiet diplomacy in resolving the Zimbabwean problem?
• What were the effects of the Zimbabwean problem on Zimbabwean and South African citizens?
• How effective was quiet diplomacy in resolving the Zimbabwean problem?

1.6 Rationale/Motivation for carrying out the study

The motivation for carrying out the study is that a lot has been said about South Africa’s role in solving its neighbour’s current problems; therefore the study seeks to uncover the reasons why South Africa continued to use quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe. The study also aims to uncover the effects of the Zimbabwean problem on both Zimbabwean and South African citizens.

1.7 Assumptions of the Study

The study assumes that South Africa adopted quiet diplomacy because it did not want to antagonize a neighbour since South Africa would benefit very much economically from the Zimbabwean problem. Zimbabwe would in the near future not challenge South Africa’s economic hegemony in the Southern African region and would therefore only continue to flourish at the mercy of South Africa.

1.8 Significance of the Study

By carrying out the study, the researcher will help the Zimbabwean and South African students undertaking research in this area to fully understand why South Africa adopted a soft approach towards the resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis. The study will also attempt to show the economic and social repercussions that quiet diplomacy has had on the ordinary Zimbabweans and South Africans.

1.9 Limitations of the Study

The research entailed that field work be conducted both in Zimbabwe and in South Africa. However, due to financial constraints, the researcher could not travel to South Africa and thus had
to rely on the South African Embassy for information. Also, as a full time employee, the researcher could not get ample time to conduct the research. To overcome this hurdle, the researcher had to work late into the night and during weekends.

1.10 Delimitations of the Study

The study focused only on Zimbabwean and South African citizens who were victim to the Zimbabwean instability. Families with relatives who are resident in South Africa were be targeted for questioning as they had first hand narratives from the relatives when they occasionally returned home. Cross border traders shuttling between Zimbabwe and South Africa were also a target in the research. The researcher also used the background knowledge that he had as he was once a migrant labourer in South Africa.

1.11 Definition of Terms

Foreign policy is a course of action that is planned and includes strategies that are carried out by policy-makers towards another state or multilateral agencies in international affairs (Venter and Landsberg: 2006).

Barston (2006) defines diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of states.

Mhango GA (2012) takes quiet diplomacy to denote a combination of soft diplomatic approaches, mostly behind-the-scenes engagements, aimed at facilitating a pacific settlement.

Collier (2006) defines conflict as a disagreement through which the parties involved perceive a threat to their needs, interests or concerns. Wertheim et al (1998) view conflict as occurring when there are real or perceived differences in interests (i.e. wants, needs, fears, concerns) that cannot be simultaneously satisfied.

Conflict resolution is viewed as a non-violent process that manages conflict through compromise, or through the assistance of a third party who either facilitates or imposes a settlement or resolution (Wertheim et al: 1998).
Hegemony implies a great capacity for coercion and/or a great degree of influence or control of the structures of the international system and the international behaviour of its units, but it excludes situations where there is the establishment of relations of direct and official control of foreign governments or territories (Antoniades: 2008).

Ulteria motive refers to an alternative or extrinsic reason for doing something, especially when concealed or when differing from the stated or apparent reason (http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/ulterior_motive).

1.12 Summary

The Chapter introduced the research topic and gave a detailed background of the Zimbabwe-South Africa relations dating back to the colonial era up to the period when the two countries attained independence, leading to the Zimbabwean crisis. A statement of the problem in which the effectiveness of quiet diplomacy was brought into question was made. The aim was to discover the reasons behind the use of quiet diplomacy and its impact. The objectives of the study were also spelt out together with the research questions. The research also cited lack of finance as a major setback to the research progress. The study was restricted to studying Zimbabweans and South Africans who were directly or indirectly affected by the Zimbabwe crisis. The following chapter will therefore review related literature as propounded by different authors in relation to the study topic.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.0 Introduction

This chapter reviews the various works that were written by an array of authors in relation to the topic under study. This chapter also discusses the theoretical framework that will underpin the thesis. In this case realism was identified as the appropriate theoretical framework to best explain why South Africa had to adopt the strategy that it adopted in dealing with the Zimbabwe crisis. The various authors’ works cited in this chapter would then be evaluated against one another and a link would then be made with the study.

2.1 Theoretical Framework

This study was guided by realism as a theory of international relations. This theory best explains the Zimbabwe-South Africa relations. Realism as a political philosophy has a history traced as far back as the classical political theorist Thucydides. Since the sixteenth century, the Europeans Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau have been its leading lights (Strohmer: 2010).

European realism holds that assumptions that the international system is anarchic; states are the most important actors; all states within the system are unitary, rational actors as they tend to pursue self-interest; states’ major aim is to acquire power and maintain it; and that the primary concern of all states is survival. At the core of realism is the assumption that the international relations between nations exist fundamentally in a state of nature described as ‘anarchy’. This is a condition in which war between nations is assumed to be permanent and expected due to the existence of sovereign nation-states, and that these sovereign nation-states are beholden to no higher power (Weber: 2005). Politically, because states have no higher authority over them, such as a world government to restrain them, anarchy means that states as collective entities are on their own on the international arena to work out how to live with one another.

Political realists hold the view that a modern state should actually be sovereign since states are considered as the main actors on the world stage. This concept of sovereignty asserts the incontestable right of the central power to make and enforce laws for people who will fall within
recognized territorial borders (Cavanaugh: 2004). The state and sovereignty are today viewed as the two non negotiable prerogatives of the head of state. In this instance, the issue of sovereignty comes into play as Zimbabwe took outside interferences in its state of affairs as a breach on its sovereignty. South Africa, a neighbour appointed as mediator in the Zimbabwean crisis was also affected by this stipulation as it could not prescribe a solution to the Harare government as this was also tantamount to outside interference. One of South Africa’s major foreign policy frameworks also expresses its strong support of state sovereignty and multilateralism (Lipton: 2009).

Since a state must ensure its survival, whatever it does is usually pursuant to the principle of national interest. National interests are therefore central to the realist theory and usually rooted in whatever a state considers necessary for maintaining its survival (Strohmer: 2010). South Africa had to take into consideration its national interests in Zimbabwe before adopting a foreign policy strategy like quiet diplomacy. South Africa stood to benefit immensely from Zimbabwe’s instability through brain drain and the influx of cheap labour from Zimbabwe to augment its construction industry. It would also benefit through the export of manufactured products in Zimbabwe; a major boost for its food industry. This was witnessed by the flooding of South African manufactured products in retail shops like OK, TM, Pick and Pay, and others at the height of the Zimbabwean crisis. As its major trading partner, South Africa could not afford to jeopardize its relations with Zimbabwe by adopting a harsher foreign policy stance. In a quest to acquire power and maintaining it, South Africa had to adopt a delaying strategy in resolving the Zimbabwean crisis. By so doing, it cemented its position as a regional hegemony with a very strong industrial base second to none in the SADC region. This also ensured that Zimbabwe would only rebuild its economy at the mercy of South Africa.

Because of the limitations imposed by sovereignty, a realist inclined leader must employ diplomacy in order to interact with other states. Morgenthau therefore termed diplomacy as the brains of national power. This implies that realist diplomacy is the art of bringing the different elements of the national power to bear with maximum effect upon those points in the international situation which concern national interest most directly. South Africa employed this tactic by constantly using diplomacy as its foreign policy tool in dealing with the Zimbabwean situation. This was achieved through the use of diplomats and other government officials’ engagements with their Zimbabwean counterparts, thereby advancing its national interests.

Basing on the above facts, realism is the most ideal theoretical framework to anchor the research.
2.2 Foreign Policy

The concept of foreign policy in international relations arguably does not have a common
definition, but rather a variety, depending on what the author or state perceives out of and the
approach or methodology that they employ when dealing with the subject (du Plessis: 2006).
Therefore as advanced by Coulter (1991), Foreign Policy denotes decisions and actions that
concern relations between one state and others in pursuit of their national interests. On the other
hand, Vale and Mpaisha (1999), opine that Foreign Policy is the sum total of all activities by which
international actors act, react and interact with the environment beyond their national borders. All
these definitions were crafted along the orthodox realists and liberal thinkers’ line of thinking who
regarded foreign policy as the prerogative of a sovereign state as the primary unit solely responsible
for the crafting and implementing of foreign policy (Morgenthau: 1966).

The realist assumption is that the international system is anarchic since it does not have a central
government. Thus, states often craft their foreign policy with a primary objective of safeguarding
their states through the development and maintenance of military and economic capabilities. The
advent of globalization has seen a rapid emergence of non-state actors including IFIs, NGOs and
MNCs within the international system. This has affected the foreign policy calculations of states
(Vincent: 2006). The interests of these other non-state actors have limited the state’s monopoly
when it comes to issues of foreign policy making. Thus, according to Morgenthau, states are no
longer considered to be the only actors among whom diplomacy is conducted, and whose conduct
of foreign policy is geared towards the maximization of power. Such a scenario is also not an
exception to South Africa’s dealings with Zimbabwe. South Africa has invested a lot in Zimbabwe
through its parastatals like Eskom and Sasol and mining conglomerates like Anglo Platinum and
Lonrho. It therefore follows that any harsher political stance that the country adopts against
Zimbabwe would likely to have negative repercussions to its economic interests in Zimbabwe. This
gives credence to Hughes’ (2004) claim that foreign policy comprises of a variety of actions carried
out by different divisions of the government of a state and directed towards other organs operating
on the international arena, with the aim of advancing national interests. In this instance, South
Africa had to craft a foreign policy that would not harm its interests in Zimbabwe.

2.2.1 Diplomacy
Berridge (2005) alludes that the concept of diplomacy is central to the concept of foreign policy, which according to du Plessis (2006) is also not easy to define. However, Barston (2006) identifies diplomacy as the art and practice of conducting negotiations between representatives of states. It usually refers to international diplomacy, i.e. the conduct of international relations through the use of professional diplomats with regards to issues of peace-making, trade, war, economics, culture, environment, and human rights. Therefore, unlike foreign policy, diplomacy principally involves the methods and mechanisms employed by states (and other actors) in the pursuit of their foreign policy goals (Akokpari, 2005). Ibid further advances that the use of diplomacy is mainly necessitated by the varying and often conflicting interests among actors (both state and non-state) so as to lessen the harm the state may do to other actors while simultaneously maximizing its benefits. As has been mentioned above, the South African government has got vested economic interests in Zimbabwe and thus it had to be very careful on its handling of the crisis because any political miscalculations could have negative repercussions to the other sectors like the economy. Despite the crisis, Zimbabwe has remained one of South Africa’s major trading partners (Makochekanwa and Tekere: 2010).

2.2.2 The Doctrine of Quiet Diplomacy

‘Quiet’ diplomacy is the opposite of ‘loud or megaphone’ diplomacy and as such refers to the use non-violent measures to solve a problem. The principal idea behind constructive engagement is that it is possible to pressure a country to institute constructive change in its policies through negotiation, mediation and critical dialogue rather than military force (Graham: 2006). On the other hand, Mhango (2012) takes quiet diplomacy to denote a combination of soft diplomatic approaches, mostly behind-the-scenes engagements, aimed at facilitating a pacific settlement. This is opposed to megaphone diplomacy which envisages the use of public diplomacy to solve issues.

In the case of Zimbabwe, Prys (2008) opines that soft diplomatic approaches include bilateral meetings between heads of state and senior officials. South Africa’s shielding of Zimbabwe from public criticism in international organizations, endorsement of questionable election results, persistent negotiations dubbed ‘constructive engagement’, and provision of economic packages with an aim of motivating change within Zimbabwe by Zimbabweans all constitute soft diplomacy. Despite reports of the worsening situation in Zimbabwe and the mass exodus of Zimbabwean citizens to neighbouring countries and further afield, President Mbeki and the majority of SADC leaders consistently and conspicuously avoided an outright condemnation of President Mugabe, let
alone the adoption of more rigorous diplomatic or economic sanctions (Schoeman: 2006). South Africa in particular, came under serious attack from critics for using this approach on Zimbabwe because they were of the opinion that Zimbabwe would never reform without being coerced. The then South African Reserve Bank Governor, Tito Mboweni is cited by Graham (2006) as remarking that Zimbabwe would never be moved by diplomacy. South Africa had the economic clout, and advanced military that it could possibly employ in order to force Zimbabwe to comply, but instead it chose to tackle the Zimbabwean crisis using soft power. This is so because of the lessons that it had learnt in conflict situations elsewhere in Africa. For example, the Nigerian crisis of 1995 made South Africa look like an apartheid time bully.

Quiet diplomacy, which was latter dubbed the ‘Mbeki Doctrine’ hinged on Mbeki’s belief that while South Africa cannot force its own views on others, it can assist in dealing with regional instabilities by offering its leadership to bring opposing groups to the negotiating table. This approach seemed to be South Africa’s only plausible option to resolving the Zimbabwean situation because it wanted to distinguish itself from the apartheid-time South Africa which only specialized in destabilizing the region and the continent. Thus the argument that a tougher stance on Zimbabwe would only serve to exacerbate the crisis, rather than solve it (McKinley: 2006).

Despite siding with ZANU (PF), South Africa eventually started engaging the Zimbabwean political parties, ZANU (PF) and the two MDC formations in order to find a lasting solution. Though sluggish, Mbeki’s quiet diplomacy managed to bring Robert Mugabe to the negotiating table with the broad democratic forces of Zimbabwe in the form of Morgan Tsvangirai, and Arthur Mutambara. These efforts eventually resulted in the signing of the GNU on 15 September 2008.

2.3 The Origins of the Zimbabwean Crisis

Zimbabwe’s problems started to surface early in the second decade of the nation’s self rule. As a first attempt, the government tried to liberalize the economy by implementing ESAP in 1990 as envisaged by IMF and WB. This presented a major shift from the state-led economy to a market driven economy (Raftopoulos and Savage: 2005). Unfortunately, the move in turn had both political and economic ramifications as it consequently contributed to the political and socio-economic crises that ensued thereafter.
To make matters worse, the Mugabe government capitulated to war veterans’ demands in 1997 (Mashingaidze: 2006). The President agreed to pay gratuities amounting to Z$50 000.00 once-off payment to each ’veteran’ and made further undertakings to pay them a monthly allowance of Z$2 000.00 as a token of appreciation for their efforts in bringing about Zimbabwe’s independence. This money was not budgeted for. Z$500 000 equaled to US$4 000.00, whilst Z$2 000.00 amounted to US$150.00 as at 1997 (Mhanda: 2011). These amounts were paid to a total of 35 000 ZANLA and ZIPRA war veterans. Resultantly, the Zimbabwean economy collapsed with the currency losing 74% of its value in a single day (Adelmann: 2004).

Furthermore, the Zimbabwe government deployed 3 000 troops in the DRC war of August 1998 in defence of the Laurent Kabila regime. This intervention ultimately costed Zimbabwe an estimated total of US$1 billion (Sachikonye: 2008). The move did a great deal of damage both to the economy and to ZANU (PF) as a political party. As had happened in 1989 with the birth of Edgar Tekere’s ZUM, the events spawned the birth of the MDC as a rival political party.

On the other hand, the land issue had been thorny on the Zimbabwe political and social agenda for some time now. Cecil John Rhodes’ BSACo forcefully seized productive land from its rightful ‘native owners’. The land theft was strengthened by the land Acts that were passed by the colonial government in Rhodesia. When the country attained its independence in 1980, it inherited a thriving agro based economy (Zikhali: 2008). However, the racially skewed land ownership continued to exist. About 6 000 white commercial farmers owned 15.5 million hectares of land, while 8 500 small-scale African farmers had 1.4 million hectares (Sachikonye: 2003). The new majority government pledged to address this disparity by acquiring and redistributing land to landless blacks in order to improve their standard of life (Kinsey: 1999).

The first phase of land redistribution exercise stretched from 1980 – 1997 in line with the Lancaster House Constitution that obligated the government to acquire land on a willing-seller/willing-buyer basis during the first ten years of independence. However, the British government and other Western donors who had initially pledged to fund the land redistribution exercise to the tune of seventy five million pounds later reneged from honouring their promises, whilst the land issue continued to gather momentum. In November 1997, the then Minister of Agriculture, Kumbirai Kangai received a letter from Clare Short, the UK Secretary for International Development in the new Labour government in which the UK government renounced funding the Zimbabwe Land Redistribution exercise citing abuse of the previously distributed funds and corruption (Cliffe et al: ...
2011). This reluctance actually stemmed from the fact that the Zimbabwe government had passed the Land Acquisition Act of 1992, which allowed it to acquire land compulsorily (Tshuma: 1997).

At the same time, the civic society in Zimbabwe in collaboration with the ZCTU and the NCA managed to score a first against ZANU (PF) by successfully inciting the Zimbabwean populace to vote against a proposed new draft constitution in 2000, which was intended to replace the Lancaster House Constitution of 1979 (Sachikonye: 2002). Sensing the danger of waning popularity and a pending electoral defeat, the ZANU (PF) government decided to use the land grab as a tool to reverse an embarrassing electoral loss (Sachikonye: 2002). It then proceeded to implement a compulsory land acquisition programme which officially started in 2000 (Moyo: 2004). The exercise was characterized by violence as landless villagers and war veterans besieged white-owned farms and vandalised farm machinery and equipment. Most of the people who resettled themselves had no prior experience to productive farming and therefore had no idea on how to continue farming. This disruption resulted in a serious drop of around 30% in agriculture output by 2004 (Richardson: 2004). Because of the link between agriculture and the manufacturing sector, the latter also experienced a contraction and the whole economy shrank by 15% by 2003 (Richardson: 2004). This sentiment is also echoed by Chitiga and Mabhugu (2008), who advanced that prior to the Fast Track Land Reform Programme, the agricultural sector employed more than 70% of the labour force, and accounted for between 9% and 15% of GDP and between 20% and 33% of export earnings.

October 2002 marked the end of what was termed as the Agrarian Revolution. However, sporadic farm invasions sanctioned by the government have continued to date. According to official estimates, a total of 11 million hectares, including the best arable land, had been transferred from about 4 000 mostly large scale white commercial farmers to about 300 000 small farmers (Sachikonye: 2003). This marked the largest and most controversial property transfer in Zimbabwe’s post independence history.

The violence that ensued during the ‘land grab’ exercise was condemned world over as it resulted in deaths and injuries of the whites and their farm workers who were being evicted. According to Hanlon et al (2013), farm buildings were set alight with farmers and their labourers brutalized as a way of forcing them out of the farms. The lawlessness went out of hand and the whole world expected South Africa to descend on its neighbour and bring resolve the land crisis. Even though South Africa condemned the violence, it insisted that Zimbabwe was right in reclaiming its land.
Moreso, South Africa still had to do something about the Zimbabwean issue as the instability was beginning to affect South Africa’s currency. The Rand’s value started to fall at the same time the Johannesburg Stock Exchange began to slide during 2000 (The Economist: 2000).

A series of successive elections (in 2002, 2005 and 2008) whose outcomes were contested all helped to accelerate the dire situation that the country was in. By 2007-2008 the situation had become so unbearable as hyperinflation pounced mercilessly on the Zimbabwean currency (Makocheakanwa and Tekere: 2010). The Zimbabwean dollar simply became worthless. Financial transactions now shifted to using a host of scarce foreign currencies like the United States dollar, South African Rand, British Pound, and the Botswana Pula. This situation spelt doom for most Zimbabweans since they did not have anywhere to obtain these currencies from (Makocheakanwa and Tekere: 2010). Despite the entire goings on, South Africa stood firm by its quiet diplomacy.

2.4 Why Quiet Diplomacy?

South Africa adopted a quiet stance on Zimbabwe for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons include; Zimbabwe-South Africa historical ties, President Mbeki’s NEPAD vision, South Africa’s tainted apartheid history and its early conflict resolution experiences with the Nigeria and DRC crises. South Africa’s realist tendencies also influenced that path that it took in resolving Zimbabwe’s case.

2.4.1 Zimbabwe-South Africa Historical Ties

Zimbabwe and South Africa share quite a strong political background. Back during the colonial era Rhodesia and South Africa were allies, working together to suppress blacks (Mills and Prins: 2008). When Zimbabwe attained its independence in 1980, South Africa was still under apartheid rule. Initially, South Africa’s ANC had closer ties with Zimbabwe’s ZAPU, whilst ZANU (PF) was aligned to PAC (Rubin: 2009). The ruling ZANU (PF) government got closer to the ANC, offering material and moral support in the fight against apartheid, simultaneously severing political ties and diplomatic recognition with the apartheid government. Some ANC officials were even housed in Harare for strategic reasons (Kalley: 1986).

After 1994’s independence, South Africa and Zimbabwe’s political relations normalised, peaking with full diplomatic recognition and integration of South Africa into the SADC (Adelmann: 2004).
For these reasons, ANC is sympathetic to the ZANU (PF) government. Mills and Clapham (1994) further uphold this claim by noting that, since the ANC was a former liberation movement supported by the Frontline states throughout their struggle; it stands to reason that the ANC has a large debt to repay. It is against this background that led former South African president, Mbeki (2002) to declare that, ‘South Africa will not abandon Zimbabweans during their greatest hour of need, in much the same way as they did not abandon us in our greatest hour of need”. This claim is further supported by Mills and Clapham’s (1994) assertion that “South Africa feels indebted to Zimbabwe for its outspokenness against apartheid and its help during those years. The ANC feels it cannot turn its back on Mugabe and ZANU-PF, which it refers to as its ‘sister party’, since both the ANC and ZANU-PF fought colonialism and oppression in their respective countries”.

Just like Zimbabwe, when South Africa realized its independence in 1994, it inherited an unresolved land question that was heavily skewed in favour of the white minority of that country. Prior to the wave of land invasions preceding and following the Zimbabwean general elections of June 2000, the discourse on land reform in South Africa centred largely around the restoration of historic rights and various technical debates about farmer settlement (Lahiff and Cousins: 2001). Ibid further posit that, prior to the 1994 elections; the ANC government had not done anything to address the land issue in South Africa. Instead, it tried its best to keep the issue off the political agenda.

Evading the South African land issue was done out of fear of destabilizing its economy recently emerging from apartheid. Fearing a copycat land invasion style in South Africa, the ANC government could not do anything but to support Zimbabwe’s land invasions and downplay the level of violence that was already being reported world over. They also gave reassurances that the events in Zimbabwe would not spread into South Africa (Mail and Guardian: 2/6/2000). Instead, Mbeki attributed the events in Zimbabwe to the failure by Britain to honour its promise of redistributing land to the landless Zimbabweans. The then ANC General Secretary, Kgalema Motlanthe even endorsed Zimbabwe’s land policy describing the farm invasions as ‘protest action’ against the failure of land reform, adding that the imbalance of land ownership in Zimbabwe was ‘immoral’ (Lahiff and Cousins: 2001). This surprise endorsement by South Africa gave Zimbabwe the impetus to continue grabbing more land, in the process disrupting agricultural production and economic activities.

2.4.2 Mbeki’s NEPAD Vision
Zimbabwe started experiencing political upheavals after the February 2000 referendum. At the same time, president Mbeki was also attempting to translate his vision of an African Renaissance - the strengthening of democratic practices and economic liberalization throughout Africa since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 - into what would eventually become the NEPAD (Graham: 2006). This constituted a third important component of South Africa’s foreign policy adaptation in the post-Cold War era (Schraeder: 2001). Resultantly, Mbeki was very sensitive to how the rest of Africa perceived his country since he required its political goodwill for the success of the initiative. NEPAD placed greater emphasis on good governance and further required African countries to pledge themselves to applying self-regulatory measures, which included isolating members who disregarded good governance and democracy (Graham: 2006). Ironically, by ignoring good governance and democracy Zimbabwe acted exactly in the opposite of Mbeki’s NEPAD vision. Surprisingly, Harare’s actions did not receive Mbeki’s condemnation partly because Mbeki was aware of the huge influence that Mugabe had on the continent’s leaders (Mhandara and Pooe: 2013). Furthermore, African intellectual elites, and grassroots opinion outside Zimbabwe strongly endorsed Mugabe’s policies (Freeman: 2005). Mbeki therefore had no option, but to tread carefully and avoid jeopardising his NEPAD plan.

2.4.3 South Africa’s realist manipulations on Zimbabwe

Following the ZANU (PF) government’s first public reversal at the polls in February 2000, Mbeki moved quickly to assist Mugabe both diplomatically and through promises of material assistance (Freeman: 2005). When Zimbabwe’s economic woes continued to mount, Pretoria extended a life line to the Harare government to the tune of a R1 billion economic ‘rescue package’ that ensured that she settled her debts with South African parastatals; Eskom and Sasol that supplied it with electricity and fuel respectively (McKinley: 2004).

Though the move was designed to avert a plunge into total chaos in Zimbabwe, this was South Africa’s way of safeguarding its interests in the country by ensuring the ZANU (PF) government’s continued political survival. McKinley further notes that South African economic support for Zimbabwe was prompted chiefly by concerns about the degree of Zimbabwean indebtedness to South African parastatal corporations, the main vehicles for the ANC’s strategy of nurturing a black business class. Such calculations were realist in nature as they ensured protection of ANC elites interests in Zimbabwe.
Though South Africa played the good neighbour by offering refugee to displaced Zimbabweans, it benefitted immensely from Zimbabwe’s instability through brain gain (Chimanikire: 2005). The influx of cheap labour from Zimbabwe augmented South Africa’s construction industry, in the process transforming its economy into a powerhouse. This supports the realistic assertion that a state’s major aim is to acquire power and maintain it. Since the primary concern of all states under realism is survival, South Africa ensured its survival as a state by flooding its manufactured products in Zimbabwean retail shops like OK, TM, Pick and Pay, and others at the height of the Zimbabwean crisis.

2.4.4 South Africa’s early experiences in Conflict Resolution in Lesotho, the DRC, and Nigeria

In the early years of the post-apartheid period, the Mandela government believed it had to concentrate primarily on the transition in South Africa rather than on larger continental or global problems (Freeman (2005). However, South Africa’s foreign policy initiatives thereafter did not end well. A military foray in Lesotho in 1998 demonstrated South Africa’s weakness of being a bully reminiscent of the apartheid era bent on destabilizing other states (Rupiya: 2002). Furthermore, the South African government was left isolated when it opposed a military intervention in the DRC to save Kabila’s government. The governments of Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and others provided military assistance to Kabila, leaving South Africa in the cold (Vale and Maseko: 2002).

South Africa also had a diplomatic spate with Nigeria in 1998, which actually became the turning point in its foreign policy. Former South African President Nelson Mandela opposed the Sani Abacha government’s brutal execution of opposition leader Ken Saro Wiwa (Freeman: 2005). In a fit of rage, Mandela called for sanctions against Nigeria, but unfortunately no African leader took heed of his call. This deeply dented South Africa’s reputation on the continent. Therefore, when Mbeki came into power in 1999, he made it clear that South Africa would follow on a different foreign policy route. Its foreign policy would proceed on the basis of compromise and consensus with other African nations, informed by a cold-eyed realpolitik in service of South Africa’s far-ranging interests (McKinley: 2004).

In 2002 ZANU (PF) faced its first acid test as it stood against the MDC in a presidential vote. Though ZANU (PF) went on to win the election with a narrow margin, AU and SADC observers
claimed that the elections were not held under a free and fair environment. There were also reports of human rights abuses during the run up to the election period (McGreal: 2008). The USA, Britain, and the EU responded to these abuses (including the FTLRP) by slapping Zimbabwe with a set of sanctions. Having learnt it the hard way already, South Africa neither publicly denounced the Zimbabwe government nor did it move to implement harsh penalties against its neighbour. It instead condemned the imposition of sanctions and called for a peaceful resolution to the Zimbabwe crisis. This move signalled South Africa’s foreign policy shift towards what Mbeki termed compromise and consensus with other African nations.

2.5 **Sovereignty**

The term ‘sovereignty’ refers to supreme and independent power or authority in government as possessed or claimed by a state or community (Bateman: 2011). Under International Law, the issue of sovereignty is taken seriously and it prohibits foreign interference into the domestic affairs of a nation. This means that a country is free to run its affairs in its own way without having to be accountable to another state. South Africa strongly supports state sovereignty and multilateralism, arguing that external interventions in sovereign states only be undertaken under the aegis of the UN or regional organisations such as the AU or SADC (Lipton: 2009). To therefore denounce ZANU (PF) policies and to agitate for change is said to compromise the existence of Zimbabwe as a sovereign state. This is also articulated in the SADC Treaty (SADC Treaty, 1992). Interference in Zimbabwe’s domestic policies would contravene its sovereignty and deny its status as maintained by the UN Charter (Hamill and Hoffman: 2009). Ibid further argue that the experience of colonialism and neo-colonialism has made newly liberated countries extremely sensitive about their independence and sovereignty. The notion of sovereignty constitutes an important ideological weapon in wading off interference from outside.

To prove that the issue of sovereignty is of paramount importance President Mugabe has on more than one occasion appeared before the world and promised President Mbeki that he would uphold the rule of law and remove war veterans from the farms, only to deny having said that the following morning (Johnson: 2001). Under realism, this was done simply to underscore the issue of sovereignty in international relations. As if to confirm South Africa’s limitations with regards to Zimbabwe’s sovereignty, former president Kgalema Motlantle had this to say after the media attacked South Africa for refusing to publicly demonise Zimbabwe, “They go on as if we have the authority and right to tell Zimbabweans what we want them to do in their own country. After all is
said and done, it is only the Zimbabweans themselves who can resolve the crisis there. All we can do at the best of times is to play a facilitative role and try and share our views on problems in their country’ (Harvey 2012:136). Sovereignty issues therefore limited South Africa’s interference in Zimbabwe’s politics and relegated it to an advisory role rather than taking the lead role.

2.6 Impact of the Zimbabwean Crisis

2.6.1 Brain Drain

From the onset of the Zimbabwean political and economic turmoil, a lot of highly qualified and experienced labour force filtered into South Africa and other lucrative destinations. As at the end of 2009, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe stood at 94% (The Zimbabwean: 2009). Brain drain refers to the migration of professional people (as scientists, professors, or physicians) from one country to another, usually for higher salaries or better living conditions (Obia: 1993). The conditions that people run away from like political instability and lack of economic development are known as push factors, whilst those conditions in other countries like economic prosperity and political stability, which attract immigrants, are referred to as pull factors (Smyke: 2001).

In Zimbabwe, the poor remuneration, high inflation and political instability forced most professionals to immigrate to South Africa and other foreign destinations like the United Kingdom and Botswana which offered hope for these professionals to fend for their children back home. South Africa benefitted immensely from the influx as it boosted its work force using migrant labour. Acknowledging the numbers of Zimbabwean immigrants in South Africa in 2009, President Zuma had this to say; “The estimation is that between three and four million Zimbabweans are here; that's not a small number” (Chimanikire: 2005).

The brain drain for Zimbabwe and its positive ramifications on the South African Economy further led Chimanikire (2005) to dub it as a brain gain for South Africa. Zimbabwe had invested a lot using the taxpayer’s money from the fiscus to train its human resource, which instead of ploughing back to the economy, ended up being snatched by other countries. The Zimbabwean government lost significant revenue through brain drain. These resources could have been used in upgrading infrastructure and technology in schools, hospitals and other vital public services (Nyanga et al: 2012). Producing and nurturing human capital costs a fortune and usually implies forgoing other areas of need in prioritization of education. Nyanga et al go on to claim that the government lost
critical human capital in which it had invested resources through education and specialized training and for which it was not compensated by other nations in the region. Brain drain connotes that every year there remains fewer professionals to drive economic growth and development.

The major sectors of the economy that were severely hit by staff exodus were the education and health sectors (Chetsanga: 2003). According to the Zimbabwe Teachers Association (2009), the sector lost 4,500 teachers annually for destinations like South Africa and Botswana where remuneration was lucrative. On the other hand, the CSO (2008) indicated that Zimbabwe was losing around 4,000 nurses annually since the beginning of the millennium to the same destinations as cited above. The major reason cited for their mass departure lack of funding within their ministry and poor remuneration.

Not only were the professionals involved in labour migration. Even unskilled labour which is handy in the manual sectors of the economy also mainly filtered into South Africa for the same reasons. A prime example is the hordes of Zimbabwe manual labourers who crossed into South Africa in 2010 to cash in on the construction boom that had resulted from the country’s hosting of the 2010 World Cup. To prove that South Africa was the beneficiary, its Home Affairs scrapped visa requirements for Zimbabweans that allowed them to stay in that country for a maximum of three months per visit (The Herald: 2009: 3). In all the circumstances South Africa emerged as one of the biggest benefactors of the brain drain plague affecting its northern neighbour whilst pursuing quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe at the same time.

2.6.2 Social relations and xenophobia

Because of the influx of Zimbabwean economic and political ‘refugees’ or asylum seekers specifically into South Africa, a storm started to brew since the South African citizens began to view the Zimbabweans and other foreigners as threats. Socially, they complained that these people were thieves who stole their property and were also violent when they got drunk (Geldenhuys: 2004). To unskilled South Africans, the presence of many Zimbabweans desperately seeking employment implied competition and also diminished their bargaining power for better wages as most Zimbabweans were willing to work for lesser wages, allegedly for as little as R25 per day (Hickel: 2014). Other South Africans even held foreigners responsible for the spreading of diseases like HIV and AIDS as they claimed that female Zimbabweans were responsible for the rampant prostitution in South Africa.
South Africans became further agitated and were no longer comfortable with the presence of foreigners (Zimbabweans especially) in their country (Fabricus: 2008). They felt compelled to drive these marauding foreigners away by force. That is when xenophobic attacks ensued. The term ‘xenophobia’ refers to the irrational or unreasoned fear of that which is perceived to be foreign or strange. It emanates from the Greek word ‘xenos’, meaning ‘strange,’ or ‘foreigner’, whilst ‘phobos’, implies ‘fear’ (Bolaffi: 2003).

Xenophobia in South Africa can be traced way back to 1994 after elections when in December 1994, in Alexandra, ‘armed youth gangs destroyed foreign-owned property and demanded that foreigners be removed from the area’ (Misago et al. 2009). Furthermore, even politicians like former Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi way back in 1997 once made sensational claims that ‘illegal aliens’ were costing South African taxpayers ‘billions of rands’ each year (Culbertson: 2006).

Xenophobia reached a crescendo in May 2008 when sporadic violence against Zimbabweans and other foreign nationals were physically attacked in Alexandra Township - Johannesburg, then spread throughout the Gauteng, then to the Western Cape and Kwa-Zulu Natal. Sixty-two people were resultantly killed, and more than 100,000 were displaced (Buchholz: 2008). One of the major causes for the outbreak of violence, according to Esses et al. (2001) was that the influx of Zimbabweans exacerbated tensions between communities as competition for services tightened. Ibid (2001) further advanced that in northern America, large scale migration resulted in a feeling of threat for the host community either because of perceptions of economic strain or as a result of cultural dissimilarity’.

On the other hand, Dodson and Oelofse (2000), in a study of the causes of xenophobia in Cape Town found out that, in a context of extreme poverty and very high unemployment, competition for jobs became the main factor driving the division among the communities between indigenes and foreigners. Most South Africans are poor and felt the heat over competing for scarce resources like jobs against foreigners.

The South African government was supposed to guarantee the safety of Zimbabwean immigrants since it was actively involved in the mediation process of the Zimbabwean crisis. Instead, government employees like police officers and immigration officials - just like most of their
politicians - were equally culpable of xenophobic attacks. Culbertson (2006) further argues that the SAPS continued to brutalize and deport Zimbabwean immigrants. They even went to the extent of rounding up Zimbabwean immigrants camped up at the United Methodist Church in central Johannesburg and arrested them with the intention to deport them.

According to Chimanikire (2005) one man described how staff at a refugee centre demanded bribes from queuing Zimbabweans, and routinely whipped and hit those seeking asylum. Those who went through the formal border immigration processes were also subjected to dehumanizing treatment by the immigration officials. Another Zimbabwean immigrant complained that he had been to the refugee office six times but still did not succeed in getting the form needed to apply for asylum. The authorities told him that they dealt with Zimbabweans once a week, on Tuesdays. However, when he got there, the guards hit him with whips and ordered him away. That in itself made him feel ashamed to be a Zimbabwean exiled in South Africa.

Xenophobia was also evident in private and public schools as those Zimbabwean students who failed to speak local South African ‘languages’ were branded as ‘makwerekwere’, meaning foreigners.

2.7 Did South Africa have an ulterior motive by adopting quiet diplomacy?

The adoption of quiet diplomacy both had realist and idealist tendencies in South Africa’s foreign policy display. However, most thinkers tend to hold the notion that by involving realism, South Africa really haboured an ulterior motive on the Zimbabwean crisis. Mostly, this had something to do with the issue of national interest.

Zimbabwe’s temporary paralysis implied that South Africa would benefit economically from its struggling neighbour by siphoning off the best brains that the country had for its own benefit. This was the brain drain that was earlier on alluded to by scholars like Chetsanga and Chimanikire. Under the pretext of hospitality, South Africa immensely benefitted from the brain gain and ensured the permanent stay of these ‘foreigners’ by offering them immediate permanent residence permits (Lipton: 2009). The unskilled labour force helped South Africa construct the massive infrastructure that was requisite for its hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2010. These are the same people who were again left at the mercy of the ordinary South Africans and government officials.
By delaying the resolution of the Zimbabwean crisis, South Africa ensured that its industry benefitted immensely from a ready market created in Zimbabwe as a result of the economic meltdown. Its products found way and dominated the Zimbabwean retail market. Shops like OK, TM, Pick and Pay, and others stocked goods sourced mainly from South Africa. This development allowed South Africa’s industry to spread and strengthen to ensure its economic dominance over SADC. Zimbabwe’s attempts to rebuild its economy will now be at the mercy of the South Africans as it is now in a forced state of permanent dependency on South Africa. Lipton (2009) quoted the Zimbabwean newspaper claiming that South Africa had bought Zimbabwe through massive investment in food, beer, gold, oil, power, banking, and agriculture.

However, despite being realistic, South Africa was idealistic in recognizing Zimbabwe’s sovereignty as a state by refusing to interfere in its affairs, choosing to play an advisory role instead. Idealists believe that it is not the use of force that influences people to change, but rather leading by democratic example (Weber: 2005). Therefore by negotiating for democratic elections, South Africa really wanted to inspire Zimbabwe to follow its example. South Africa has on many occasions defended Zimbabwe from Western onslaught and has thus acted in accordance to the policy of good neighbourliness.

2.8 Effectiveness of quiet diplomacy on the Zimbabwean case

Quiet diplomacy has arguably been branded as a failed foreign policy tool in Zimbabwe judging from the time it took to strike a peace deal. It is worth noting that at the time when Mbeki was busy negotiating behind closed doors, violence was continuing in Zimbabwe and the ZANU (PF) was not relenting on its stranglehold on power. Despite the assurances by Mbeki that violence would stop, Mugabe blatantly refused to heed Mbeki’s calls (Graham: 2006). This goes a long way to prove how dysfunctional quiet diplomacy was on the Zimbabwean crisis.

It took closer to a decade for Mbeki to strike a breakthrough. The GPA which gave birth to the GNU was signed in September 2008 and brought in a new dispensation to the Zimbabwe political climate as a hybrid government comprising of ZANU (PF), MDC-T, and MDC assumed power (Hartwell: 2013). The AU and SADC acted as the guarantors of the GPA. This brought in some normalcy by containing hyperinflation and kick starting industrial revival (Raftopoulos: 2010).
However, the effectiveness of the GPA was quickly put into question as the arrangement was marred by constant bickering from the three parties. ZANU (PF) was accused of stifling the smooth flow of government by bullying the other inexperienced parties. Despite numerous attempts by the two MDCs to bring the problems to the attention of the guarantors, they hit a brick wall and were left at the mercy of ZANU (PF) (Raftopoulos: 2012). ZANU (PF) even went to the extent of dissolving government in 2013 and unilaterally declared harmonized elections in the same year. The elections again brought with them another contested outcome, which however was endorsed by both the AU and SADC.

2.9 Summary

The chapter discussed the theoretical framework which informs the thesis. In this case, the study identified realism as a suitable framework. Literature which gives the background of the Zimbabwean crises, coupled with South Africa’s reactions was discussed. The Chapter also went further to discussing the impact of quiet diplomacy on citizens of both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Brain drain and xenophobia were some of the issues that were discussed under the chapter. Chapter 3 will outline the research methodology that was adopted in conducting this research.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

3.0 Introduction

This chapter spells out the way the research project was carried out by describing the research methodology and design. It is very significant in that it spells out the path that the researcher took in seeking for answers to the research problems using the qualitative paradigm. This was achieved by identifying the research instruments, population, sampling and sampling techniques, procedures used for collecting the data, as well as a brief statement on data analysis and presentation. In this context the target population are the vulnerable groups from both South Africa and Zimbabwe, who feel the direct impact of the instability in Zimbabwe in their day to day lives.

3.1 Research Methodology

Research Methodology refers to the systematic, theoretical analysis of the methods applied to a field of study. It comprises the theoretical analysis of the body of methods and principles associated with a branch of knowledge. Typically, it encompasses concepts such as paradigm, theoretical model, phases and quantitative or qualitative techniques (Irny and Rose: 2005). Research methodology is vital in that it specifies the research design approach that a research would adopt. Also under research design are issues of population and the justification for a sample size adopted for the study. The various research instruments that a study makes use of are also identified and have their use justified with regards to the research at hand.

3.2 The Approach

Though the research was qualitative, it utilized an approach known as triangulation. Triangulation refers to the use of more than one approach to the investigation of a research question in order to enhance confidence in the findings (Bryman: 2011). Much of social research is founded on the use of a single research method and as such may suffer from limitations associated with that method or from the specific application of it. Triangulation therefore offered the researcher the prospect of enhanced confidence (Denzin & Lincoln: 2005). In this case, methodological triangulation involving the use of both qualitative and quantitative research to determine how far the two arrive
at convergent findings was used to gather data. Triangulation therefore became a powerful technique that facilitated validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources.

### 3.2.1 Qualitative Research

One of the major advantages of using qualitative research is that it was conducted under natural settings and made use of the researcher as a key research tool (Creswell: 2007). Interviews were carried out under natural settings in which the respondents felt comfortable without necessarily experimental manipulation. The researcher as the key research tool had to visit the respondents in their domains and thus was able to gain honest opinions.

Qualitative research gave the researcher the ability to interact with the research subjects in their own language and on their own terms (Kirk and Miller: 1986). This was a major advantage as some respondents were not conversant in the English language. Thus, when interviews were conducted, the researcher regularly code switched from English language to the vernacular Shona when there was need for clarification. This gave the researcher the advantage and impetus to clarify issues that the questionnaire had failed to effectively pose due to the language barrier through holding interviews. Using qualitative research made it flexible for the researcher to perform data collection, subsequent analysis, and interpretation of collected information.

Carrying out qualitative research provided a holistic view of the phenomena under investigation (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975; Patton, 1980). In this case, researching on issues like the Zimbabwe crisis with the actual people affected or involved provided a vivid picture of what really transpired and thus invoked emotional responses from the respondents as they sought of ‘relive’ the situation while responding to questions.

### 3.2.2 Quantitative Research

Quantitative data refers to any data that is in numerical form such as statistics, percentages, etc (Given: 2008). In other words it implies that the quantitative researcher asks a specific, narrow question and collects a sample of numerical data from participants to answer the question. It complimented qualitative research by helping to quantify responses for easier analysis. Quantitative research involved the use of a questionnaire with rating scales. A rating scale was
more useful to the research when a behaviour needed to be evaluated on a continuum (Leedy & Ormrod: 2001).

3.3 Research Paradigm

This research utilized the qualitative research paradigm. Denzin and Lincoln (2005) identify qualitative research paradigm as a method of inquiry employed in many different academic disciplines, traditionally in the social sciences, but also in market research and further contexts. They further expound that qualitative researchers aim to gather an in-depth understanding of human behaviour and the reasons that govern such behaviour. The qualitative method investigates the why and how of decision making, not just what, where, when. Hence, smaller but focused samples were used as compared to large samples. In this case, qualitative design helped to address the ‘why’ aspect with regards to the reasons for South Africa’s quiet stance over the Zimbabwe crisis. Creswell (2007) further justifies the use of the qualitative research paradigm by arguing that qualitative research is conducted because a problem or issue needs to be explored. This exploration is needed, in turn, because of a need to study a group or population, identify variables that can then be measured, or hear silenced voices. Additionally, Creswell argues that these are all good reasons to explore a problem rather than to use predetermined information from the literature or rely on results from other research studies. Therefore, the adoption of the qualitative research paradigm was ideal for this research because the researcher needed to extract information from silenced voices amongst the population. In this case, data was also sought from both ordinary Zimbabwean nationals, who formed the bulk of the study population. These were the same people whose voices are silenced because of their lack of influence. The South African Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also provided some of the information required by the research through interviews and questionnaires.

3.4 Target Population

A target population refers to the group or the individuals to whom the study applies (Kitchenham and Pfleeger: 2002). In other words, the research sought those groups or individuals who are in a position to answer the questions and to whom the results of the research apply. Ideally, a target population should be represented as a finite list of all its members. In concurrence, Lavrakas (2008), views the target population as the entire set of units for which the survey data are to be used to make inferences. Thus, the target population defines those units for which the findings are meant
to generalize. In this case, the target population referred to both the Zimbabwean and South African citizens.

3.5 **Sampling**

A population commonly contains too many individuals to study conveniently, so an investigation is often restricted to one or more samples drawn from it. A sample therefore, is simply a subset of all the units of analysis which make up the population (Hays: 1981). Samples are used in statistical testing when population sizes are too large for the test to include all possible members or observations. A sample should represent the whole population and not reflect bias towards a specific attribute. The researcher employed purposive sampling on key informants, implying that participants were selected because they were likely to generate useful data for the project (Brikci: 2007). In the interest of time and money, convenience sampling, a non-probability technique was used. Convenience sampling implied selecting whoever is easiest and convenient. This method however, suffers from the problem of low credibility. In this case this shortcoming was of little significance to the researcher since the Zimbabwe crisis affected almost everybody regardless of location. Therefore, most respondents were generated from Bindura and Harare - places which were easily accessible to the researcher.

**3.5.1 Purposive Sampling**

The purposive sampling technique, also called judgment sampling, is the deliberate choice of an informant due to the qualities the informant possesses. It is a nonrandom technique that does not need underlying theories or a set number of informants. Simply put, the researcher decided what needed to be known and set out to find people who could and were willing to provide the information by virtue knowledge or experience (Bernard 2002, Lewis & Shepherd 2006). The researcher therefore employed this technique because of its convenience.

**3.5.2 Convenience Sampling**
A convenience sample, also called a non-probability or opportunity sample, among other names, is a sample drawn without any underlying probability-based selection method (Price: 2013). The subjects were selected just because they are easiest to recruit for the study and the researcher did not consider selecting subjects that were representative of the entire population.

In all forms of research, it would be ideal to test the entire population, but in most cases, the population is just too large that it is impossible to include every individual. This is the reason the researcher relied on sampling techniques like convenience sampling, the most common of all sampling techniques (Explorable.com: Sep 16, 2009). The researcher preferred this sampling technique because it is fast, inexpensive, easy and the subjects are readily available.

## 3.6 Sampling Procedure

Purposive sampling was used to extract information from the South African Embassy officials and officials from the Ministries of Trade and Economic Development and Foreign Affairs. Members of the academia in the Faculties of Commerce and Social Sciences and Humanities at Bindura University of Science Education, and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe were also selected basing on their availability.

Civic societies and pressure groups dealing with political, human rights and economical issues were selected basing on the fact that they took some interest in such the matter under study. These included the CZC, the ZCTU, the CCJP and the ZESN.

In order to get the perspective of other key informants, i.e. the Zimbabwe cross border traders, the researcher targeted Roadport, KuMbudzi and Machipisa bus termini at in order to hold brief interviews with traders who intended to board buses or those who had just arrived from South Africa.
Convenience sampling was handy for the researcher when he distributed questionnaires to selected households around Bindura town, especially in Chipadze and Chiwaridzo high density townships. Such households were evident by wares for sale displayed outside their houses.

3.7 Data Collection Methods

The researcher made use of quantitative and qualitative methods of data collection. These included questionnaires, interviews and written/secondary records such as publications and newspaper articles as data collection instruments.

3.7.1 Questionnaire

A questionnaire is a research instrument consisting of a series of questions and other prompts for the purpose of gathering information from respondents (Burns and Bush: 2010). The researcher made use of questionnaires to extract information from Embassy officials, ministry officials, civic society, members of the academia, and other key informants. The type of questionnaire that was administered by the researcher was the mixed type, which contained both structured matrix or closed questions and unstructured open ended questions. Closed questions contained questions that required the respondent pick an answer from a given number of options. Closed questions made it easier for respondents to fill in since they would just select a response from a given matrix. On the other hand, open ended questions asked the respondent to formulate his/her own answer (Timpany: 2011). Open ended questions were posed in instances where there was need to probe deeper into the respondents in order to get their personal feelings with regards to the matter under discussion (see Annexes 1 & 2). This was appropriate because open ended questions are not restrictive and respondents normally write what they want and think without reservations.

3.7.1.1 Advantages of using Questionnaires
The use of questionnaires in the research ensured that large quantities of information on the effects of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy were collected from a large number of people within a short period of time and in a relatively cost effective way. In this case, the questionnaires were simply hand delivered or e-mailed to respective government employees. Questionnaires further allowed the researcher to gather responses in a standardized way, thereby ensuring objectivity since all the respondents had to systematically respond to questions posed sequentially. The questionnaires allowed the researcher or research assistants to carry them around without any effect to their validity and reliability. They also made it easier for the researcher to quickly and easily quantify the results of the research through the use of a software package (Microsoft Excel).

### 3.7.1.2 Disadvantages of using Questionnaires

Responses from government officials and Embassy officials took long to come. However, the researcher made telephone follow ups in order to recover the completed questionnaires.

The questionnaires were also inadequate in that they did not allow the researcher to understand some forms of information like changes in emotions, behaviour or feelings. No matter how good the questionnaire was, other respondents read the questions differently, and thus proffered responses based on their understanding of the questions. Furthermore, open ended questions had the tendency to generate large quantities of data that took long to process and analyse. As a mitigatory measure, the researcher used triangulation, in which interviews were carried out to complement the questionnaires.

### 3.7.2 Interviews

The ‘interview’ is a managed verbal exchange between two or more people where questions are asked by the interviewer to elicit facts or statements from the interviewee (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003 and Gillham, 2000). Frey and Oishi (1995) concur and see it as a purposeful conversation in which one person asks prepared questions (interviewer) and another answers them (respondent). The researcher made use of semi structured interviews in this research. Semi-structured interviews consisted of several key questions that helped to define the areas to be explored, but also allowed the researcher or respondent to diverge in order to pursue an idea or response in more detail (Gill: 2008).
The researcher employed focus group interviews at the Bindura Town flea market. This was appropriate for respondents gathered in numbers of between 6-12 (Wimmer and Dominick: 1997). The focus group interviews were carried out after a prior arrangement with the interviewees as a follow up to the questionnaires that had earlier on been dispatched in homesteads chosen to participate in the research. Ibid (1997) further view focus group interviews as a research strategy for understanding audience attitudes and behaviour. Nichols (1994) opines that members of the group should share similar backgrounds in order to rule out any confounding variables. In this instance, the respondents were all cross border traders.

One on one interviews were held at varying intervals at Road Port, Kumbudzi, and Machipisa bus termini. This type of interview was ideal for a small sample averaging 30 people (Nichols: 1991). This was appropriate because it was difficult for the researcher to gather cross border traders in large numbers at one go at the bus termini. The researcher therefore only interviewed those individuals who had time to spare. In all cases, the interviews were guided by an interview schedule (See Annex 3).

3.7.2.1 Advantages of using Interviews

Focus groups and one to one interviews, allowed the researcher to collect preliminary information about the topic. Moreover, focus group interviewing proved to be much cheaper and quicker to carry out as more participants were interviewed at one go. This approach was also flexible as it provided a large quantity of detail. All the ambiguities that were found in questionnaires were clarified and incomplete answers followed up on (triangulation). Interviews also allowed the researcher to code-switch to the vernacular language whenever situations of misunderstanding arose.

3.7.2.2 Disadvantages of using Interviews

The interviewer initially faced resistance from respondents who were not sure of his intentions especially at public places like bus termini. He eventually established rapport with them and the interviews went on well. Furthermore, one-on-one interviews were very time consuming considering that a total of 30 different individuals were to be interviewed. On the other hand, the semi-structured approach sometimes made it difficult to generalise responses on a larger scale.
However, responses from the questionnaires made it easy for the researcher to generalize such responses. There was also a tendency by some of the respondents to dominate others during focus group interviews. As noted by Wimmer and Dominick that dominant respondents can negatively affect the outcome of the group, and that group pressures may influence the comments made by individuals. The researcher ensured that he constantly controlled the discussion and made sure that dominant respondents were controlled.

3.7.3 Review of Secondary Data

A secondary source is a report on the findings of the primary source. While not as authoritative as the primary source, the secondary source often provided a broad background and readily improved the researcher’s learning curve. Most textbooks and journals are secondary sources; they report and summarize the primary sources (Don. Stacks: 2002). Therefore, secondary data is the data that have been already collected by and readily available from other sources. A lot has been said about the Zimbabwe crisis and its effects. Most authors have written about it and the crisis was topical in many journals and newspapers. The researcher therefore, could not find any reason to ignore such a rich source of information on the crisis. Several publications relevant to the issue as acknowledged in the literature review were consulted. Published results from authorities like the ZIMSTATS provided valuable statistics on the issue of brain drain, labour migration and inflationary issues.

3.7.3.1 Advantages of using Secondary Data

Using secondary data saved a lot of the researcher’s time since most of the information required was easily available online. This information was gathered at relatively no cost at all to the researcher since he used institutional internet connectivity. Moreover, the use of secondary research helped the researcher to clarify the research questions since secondary research is often used prior to primary research in helping to clarify the research focus. Furthermore, secondary data helped to make primary data collection more specific as the researcher was able to identify the gaps and deficiencies and additional information that needed to be collected. Secondary data provided the researcher with a basis for comparison of the data that was collected and the data that was already in existence.

3.7.3.2 Disadvantages of using Secondary Data
The researcher had no control over the quality of data gathered as it emanated from other sources. However, comparisons with primary data helped to solve the problem. Sometimes the data failed to fit into the spectrum of the research questions of the project, thereby prompting the researcher to look for alternative data. Secondary sources provided information only about respondent’s verbal behaviour and provided no direct information on the respondent’s nonverbal behaviour. This shortcoming was addressed through triangulation.

3.8 Data Validity

Data validity is taken to refer to the extent to which a measure, indicator or method of data collection possesses the quality of being sound or true as far as can be judged. In social sciences generally, the relationship between indicators and measures and the underlying concepts they are taken to measure is often contested (Jary and Jary: 1995). While research validity is measured in several ways, those evaluating research results should keep asking this simple question: Is the research measuring what it is supposed to measure? If the researcher has doubts about the answer to this question then it is possible the results should also be questioned. Validity is important because it can help determine what types of tests to use, and help to make sure researchers are using methods that are not only ethical, and cost-effective, but also a method that truly measures the idea or construct in question (Cozby: 2009). In order to ensure accuracy, the questionnaires and interview schedules were pilot-tested on colleagues who were on the lookout for clarity, ambiguity, grammaticality, and other issues. These were then noted and corrected. The triangulation technique also facilitated validation of data through cross verification from two or more sources. In this case, the questionnaire responses were cross verified with interview responses and to some extent with secondary sources.

3.9 Data Collection Procedures and Ethical Considerations

The researcher sought for permission from relevant authorities to conduct interviews at public places like Road Port. Thereafter, the researcher was on the lookout for cross border traders en route to South Africa. He then introduced himself and sought for their cooperation and consent in responding to questions posed after having assured them that their responses were meant only for academic purposes and that confidentiality would be maintained at all costs. He also assured them that they would get copies of the published findings should they wish to. Thereafter, the researcher held one on one interviews with those respondents who were available. The sessions lasted for
about 10 minutes each because the respondents were actually waiting to board buses and had no more time to spare. These interviews were held once off at Road Port, KuMbudzi, and Machipisa bus termini with ten (10) participants each.

As for the focus group interviews and questionnaires, the researcher with the help of 2 research assistants visited a flea market in town where South Africa imported wares were on sale. He then introduced himself and stated the purpose of his visit. The respondents were assured that the research was for scholarly purposes only and that their identities would be kept confidential. They were also informed that they were not being forced to participate in the study and should they wish to withdraw, they would freely do so at any time. After having obtained informed consent, the researcher then kindly requested any respondents who had experience in the South Africa cross border business or anyone who had worked or was still working in South Africa during the period 2000 to 2013 to respond to the questionnaire. After distributing a total of ten questionnaires, the researcher informed the respondents that he would return the following day to collect the questionnaires and then conduct a focus group interview that lasted for 30 minutes.

Embassy, Ministry officials, and the civic society were telephoned prior to the despatch of questionnaires. The questionnaires were later e-mailed to them for their responses. Completed questionnaires were again returned to the researcher by e-mail. A total of five officials from each organization (ie ZESN, ZCTU, CZC, CCJP, Embassy of South Africa, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development) were targeted by the questionnaires. Members of the academia constituted the largest number of respondents based on their availability. A total of ten (10) questionnaires were dispatched to BUSE, whilst fifteen (15) were dispatched at UZ. The UZ received the largest number of questionnaires because of its bigger population. Cumulatively, a total of 70 questionnaires were dispatched.

3.10 Data Presentation and Analysis

Data collected from the data gathering process were analysed both manually and electronically. All qualitative data were presented in the form of themes, whilst quantitative data were presented in the form of tables, pie charts, bar graphs and histograms. These were generated by Microsoft Excel.

3.11 Summary
The foregoing chapter discussed the methodology which encompassed the research design, gave a brief description of qualitative research and its characteristics. The target population consisting of government officials, embassy officials, academics, members of the civic society and other key informants identified. A sample of respondents was also drawn out. Purposive and convenience sampling were employed in order to cut on financial and time implications. Interviews, questionnaires and secondary data were used as research instruments employed to gather data. The questionnaires and interview schedules used by the study were pretested for validity, with corrections being made in order to improve on the instruments’ efficiency. Data collection procedures were highlight with particular emphasis on the ethical considerations that the research employed during his conduct with respondents. Finally it was reported that both manual and electronic data analysis methods would be made use of when interpreting the data. The chapter that follows will now report on the analysis in detail.
CHAPTER FOUR

DATA PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

4.0 Introduction

This chapter focuses on data presentation from the findings of the questionnaires and interviews. The data were analysed and discussed to find out the perceptions of the respondents with regards to South Africa’s role in solving the Zimbabwean crisis. Data from secondary sources were also used to support or show disparities on the responses that were given by respondents. In order to aid the qualitative discussion, quantitative presentations in tabular form, pie charts and graphs were employed.

4.1 Respondent Demography

The participants in the study were categorized cross cuttingly in order to obtain balanced responses from almost all the sectors of the society. The crisis affected everyone especially the ordinary citizens. For that reason, they were given a platform to contribute towards the study. Apart from these, the researcher also interviewed members from the South African Embassy; The Zimbabwean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Trade and Economic Development; members from the civic society and pressure groups; and the academia. Questionnaires were e-mailed to some of these officials in a bid to curb operational costs. Members of the academia’s questionnaires were personally administered to them. The same applied to ordinary members of the society who were chosen to participate in the study. On the other hand, focus group interviews were carried out with key informants at a town flea market. Finally, face to face interviews were held with other key informants at Road Port, KuMbudzi, and Machipisa bus termini.

Table one below shows sample respondents that were given questionnaires and how they responded.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Name of Organization</th>
<th>Targeted Participants</th>
<th>Actual Participants</th>
<th>% Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

liv
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>South African</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embassy</td>
<td>Ministry of</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governmental Ministries</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Society</td>
<td>ZESN</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Society</td>
<td>ZCTU</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Society</td>
<td>CZC</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civic Society</td>
<td>CCJP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>BUSE</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academia</td>
<td>UZ</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Flea Market</td>
<td>Other Key</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Town Flea Market</td>
<td>Informants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>70</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Table 1: Questionnaire Responses*
The response rate judging from the number of questionnaires returned against the number of questionnaires issues was generally good as a total of 59 from the 70 questionnaires issued were subsequently returned. This translated to an 84% response rate. Such a response rate ensured a balanced judgement by the researcher when he published his research findings.

However, in a bid to gain a clearer picture of the responses, the researcher made follow ups in the form of interviews for key informants. Table 2 below shows the distribution of interviews that were held.

Table 2: Interview Participation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Targeted Participants</th>
<th>Actual Participants</th>
<th>% Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Key Informants</td>
<td>Road Port</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KuMbudzi</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Machipisa</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Town Flea Market</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>40</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
<td><strong>80%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The interview response rate was also very good and ensured encouraging results. The researcher had a target of 40 participants, of which 32 participated. This was quantified to represent 80% of the total respondents. The response rate ensured a successful generalization of results as envisaged by Kitchenham B and Pfleeger SL (2002). Respondents were urged to respond truthfully since their responses would be held in strict confidence.
Figure 1

The Zimbabwean crisis was characterised by political, economic and social factors. Politically, there were violent clashes between ZANU (PF) and MDC supporters resulting in the displacing and even death of some members aligned to both parties. Economically, the economy was shrinking as a result of economic mismanagement by the government, the FTLRP, and the wrapping up of industry as a result of the hyperinflationary environment they were operating under. This resulted in high unemployment rates and made life unbearable for the host of Zimbabweans. On the social side, service delivery fell sharply as the government failed to meet its obligations. This even resulted in the cholera pandemic that hit Zimbabwe in 2008 (Thornycroft P: 2008) as the health sector suffered from severe under funding. The education provision also reeled heavily from under funding and a debilitating brain drain as most professionals transited into South Africa and other better rewarding countries.

The mixed responses to chart one above indicate that the majority of the respondents opine that the crisis was triggered by political instability prevailing in the country starting in 2000 when ZANU (PF) lost the referendum to the NCA and MDC’s ‘No’ vote campaign, a position which is also supported by Sachikonye (2002) and Kaarhus, Derman and Sjaastad (2013). It was also noted that ZANU (PF) realized that its chances of winning future elections in a free and fair environment were slim. It therefore resorted to use coercion to force the electorate to capitulate, resulting in an unstable political environment as other political parties sought to retaliate as a way of protecting themselves and their supporters.
On the other hand, 34% remarked that the Fast Track Land Reform (FTLR) was the major driver of the Zimbabwean crisis. The academics advanced FTLR was not carried out as a way of empowering people, but rather a political move to ensure ZANU (PF)’s survival against the highly popular MDC. Therefore land redistribution was not carried out on the basis of merit, but was indiscriminate and resulted in inexperienced and uncommitted ‘farmers’ getting prime agricultural land. This is a standpoint which is also reinforced by Richardson’s (2004) assertion that as a result of the agrarian revolution agricultural production fell by 30% by the year 2004 resulting in ripple effects to the agro-based economy.

15% of the respondents mainly made up of government and Embassy officials indicated that the crisis was caused by sanctions that were imposed by the West in cahoots with the USA after Zimbabwe embarked on a ‘chaotic’ FTLR and alleged human rights abuses. According to one respondent from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

“The sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe by the West and its allies as a retributive measure following Zimbabwe’s move to repossess its land, hurting their interests in the process. To him, the claim that sanctions were ‘targeted’ was just political rhetoric as it was apparent to all that it was the ordinary citizens that suffered instead of the targeted top ZANU (PF) officials”.

The above statement also indicates a notion of realism as the West employed hard power strategies on Zimbabwe in order to safeguard their economic interests in the country. However, judging from the responses on sanctions, there is also a clear indication of scepticism that Zimbabwe’s economic collapse was triggered by the sanctions.

On the other hand, six percent of the respondents felt that there were other causes of the Zimbabwean crisis other than the ones mentioned above. These include ESAP, alleged economic abuses by the government such as the awarding of gratuities to war veterans to Zimbabwe government’s involvement in the 1998 DRC war. This opinion is also shared by Mhandara and Pooe (2013).

4.3 Reasons for South Africa’s use of Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe

*Table 3*
Table 3 shows the respondents’ indications on South Africa’s reasons for adopting quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe.

4.3.1 Historical Ties

All respondents concurred that South Africa adopted quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe because of the two countries inseparable historical ties. Mostly the academics, civil society, and government officials pointed out that the two countries had a strong political background, one in which both countries were once colonized by the BSACo. They further indicated that Zimbabwe was instrumental in assisting the ANC and PAC of South Africa in their fight against apartheid. The notion is also shared by Mills and Prins (2008). Kalley (1986) goes on to say that the ZANU (PF) government even housed ANC officials in Harare. An Embassy official also noted that President Mugabe played an influential role by his outspokenness as part of the Frontline States leaders’ fight against apartheid. Therefore, to them South Africa could not abandon Zimbabwe in its hour of need.

Another Foreign Affairs official went on to say that South Africa attributed Zimbabwe’s crisis as having emanated from Britain’s refusal to fund the land redistribution programme as it had earlier on pledged to do. This move was supported by ANC because South Africa was also a victim of the unequal land distribution which favours the white community. This is supported by Lahiff and Cousins (2001) who quoted Kgalema Mothlante’s endorsement of Zimbabwe’s land policy describing the farm invasions as ‘protest action’ against the failure of land reform, further adding that the imbalance of land ownership in Zimbabwe was ‘immoral’. The statement also clearly exposes the sentiments within ANC with regards to the land issue, which they knew that their country would also have to inevitably address in the future.
4.3.2 Mbeki’s NEPAD vision

Forty respondents supported the notion that Mbeki’s Africa Renaissance which brought about NEPAD also had a role to play in South Africa’s choice of strategy on Zimbabwe. The academics and civic society noted that Mbeki wanted to promote and strengthen the aspect of good governance in order for Africa as a whole to develop. However, the success of NEPAD hinged upon a buy in from all the continent’s leaders, a notion that was also solidified by Graham (2006). They further noted that though Zimbabwe’s actions did not fit in the realm of NEPAD, Mbeki could not afford to isolate Zimbabwe because he knew that Mugabe had a massive influence on the continent’s leaders. This claim was supported by Mhandara and Poore (2013) who noted that even the intellectuals and grassroots opinion within Africa endorsed Mugabe. Therefore, to them sidelining Mugabe meant that Mbeki risked losing the support of other leaders on his NEPAD initiative. He unwillingly had to find an accommodative strategy that would best fit into his realistic calculations.

Five respondents, mainly from other key informants (cross border traders) were undecided over the issue because they knew little about NEPAD.

The fourteen respondents that disagreed with NEPAD’s influence on Mbeki’s choice of foreign policy strategy on Zimbabwe noted that Mbeki could simply have started by lobbying for support over the Zimbabwean issue from his colleagues before embarking on NEPAD. Therefore, to them though NEPAD was coincidental, it did not influence Mbeki’s use of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe. They even noted that when the political situation continued to deteriorate Africa as a whole under the banner of AU pressurized Mugabe to put an end to the crisis in his country. These are the same people whom Mbeki thought would not support his NEPAD idea in the event that he took Mugabe head on.

4.3.3 South Africa’s early experiences in conflict resolution

The majority of respondents concurred that South Africa had learned it the hard way in its early attempts at conflict resolution. An Embassy official cited that South Africa did not want to be continuously assorted with the apartheid time label of bullying and destabilizing other states.
However, when it attacked Lesotho in 1998, it reignited that bully label. Rupiya (2002) further upheld this notion by confirming that South Africa had the initial weakness of using hard power to deal with conflict situations.

A civic organization official went on to note South Africa’s refusal to militarily assist the DRC in 1998, whilst other states like Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia obliged. This agrees with Vale and Maseko (2002), who opined that this incident further left South Africa in the cold. This isolation meant that other states within the region sidelined South Africa because it did not share the same African ideals as them.

The official went on to claim that, “Again in 1998, South Africa’s diplomatic spat with Nigeria over the execution of opposition leader Ken Saro Wiwa further dented its image as a genuine African state”. Freeman (2005) supports this assertion by advancing that other African states steadfastly refused to heed Mandela’s call for sanctions against Nigeria. These bruising events therefore led South Africa into revisiting its foreign policy strategy in a bid to improve its regional and continental standing.

The eight respondents who disagreed mainly comprised of academics. One of the reasons they put forward was that South Africa still continued to use force whenever it felt necessary. They cited the case of the Central African Republic where South Africa has been militarily involved in 2013. This recent event simply indicated that military force still remained an option for the South African government. They further noted that the only reason why South Africa did not militarily intervene in Zimbabwe was that there interests were not directly threatened and could be safeguarded using other means.

4.3.4 Realism

The majority of the respondents in the academic and civic society sectors admitted that South Africa was guided by realism when it chose quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool over other tools at its disposal like the imposition of sanctions or a military intervention. According to them, realism is marked by a constant power struggle. So in its quest of dominance, South Africa had to adopt a conflict resolution tool that would delay conflict resolution in Zimbabwe. This would in turn allow it to increase its dominance in the region by growing its industry at Zimbabwe’s expense. This was
achieved by ensuring an active economic participation in Zimbabwe through parastatals like Eskom and Sasol and mining giants like Anglo Platinum and Lonrho. McKinley (2004) further supports this standpoint by noting that South Africa financially propped up the Zimbabwean government in order to protect its interests.

Another academic noted that “By ensuring the ZANU (PF) government’s survival deemed to be sympathetic to the ANC, Pretoria was also ensuring that its interests remained in safe hands. To them, an unpredictable MDC government was likely to harm their interests in Zimbabwe”. Others also noted that by offering asylum to Zambibwean refugees, South Africa was benefitting from the human resource that was instrumental in positioning its economy at the top. All the points raised point to realist calculations that were invoked by South Africa.

Ten respondents were undecided mainly because they were really not sure about what realism entailed. The other nine respondents mainly composed of government and Embassy officials disagreed over the proposition that South Africa exhibited realist tendencies and noted that the country was acting within the confines of good neighbourliness, a notion that was also upheld by Graham (2006). They even hailed South Africa’s decision to promote cross border trading, and allowing economic immigrants into their country. This move was further lauded for easing the economic burden for ordinary Zimbabweans.

4.4 The Impact of Zimbabwe’s human migration into South Africa

Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a Political effects</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Social effects</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Economic effects</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 above indicates the respondents’ feelings on the effects of Zimbabwe’s human traffic into its northern neighbour.

4.4.1 Political Effects
A total of 47 respondents agreed that the human transit into South Africa had strong political connotations for that country. Most academics and members of the civil society held that the handling of the Zimbabwean crisis inevitably costed President Mbeki a lot of political support resulting in discontent among the rank and file of the ANC and its allies, SACP and COSATU. Resultantly, a vote of no confidence was passed against him, leading to his ultimate resignation. This notion was also upheld by the Socialist Worker.org (2008). The ANC in general came under fire from opposition parties like the DA and other pressure groups over the way it handled the crisis. Tony Leon, the former DA leader even accused the ANC of not being really interested in reform in Zimbabwe, or in democracy, or in human rights since it was continuously siding with ZANU (PF).

On the contrary, two respondents strongly disagreed over the proposition that human movement into South Africa had political implications on the host country. Additionally, ten respondents disagreed over the issue of negative political effects to the ANC as a direct result of human emigration from Zimbabwe. According to some members of the academia, Mbeki resigned after he was toppled by his own party following a long and bitter power struggle with his former deputy, Jacob Zuma. This assertion was also reinforced by McGreal (2008), who further noted that Mbeki was forced to resign from presidency over his decision to appeal Zuma’s acquittal on corruption charges by the courts over corruption charges.

4.4.2 Social Effects

This issue got the consensus of the respondents as no one contradicted with the proposition that the movement of Zimbabwean refugees had a social impact on the lives of both South African and Zimbabwean citizens living in South Africa. Most of the respondents in all categories strongly agreed with the notion that Zimbabweans’ infiltration into South Africa in large numbers had inevitable social consequences.

These varied from competition for scarce jobs, allegations of an increase in theft cases, and the increase in prostitution. This notion is strongly supported by Geldenhuys (2004) who noted that ordinary South Africans often complained that Zimbabweans were thieves who stole their property and were also violent when they got drunk. According to some academic and civic society respondents, other South Africans even accused Zimbabwean female immigrants of fuelling prostitution in South African townships. In support, Fabricus (2008) further noted that other South
Africans even held foreigners responsible for the spreading of diseases like HIV/AIDS. Other key informants brought out the idea that South Africans became further agitated and are no longer comfortable with the presence of foreigners (Zimbabweans included) in their country.

Since Zimbabweans were willing to work for as little a R25 a day, most unskilled South Africans felt hard done by these foreigners as their bargaining power was diminished (Hickel: 2014). Embassy officials also admitted to this proposition and even went to the extent of citing this as one of the reasons as to why South Africans’ and immigrant Zimbabweans’ social relations were at an all time low. This social hatred was therefore directly attributable to the xenophobic attacks perpetrated against Zimbabweans in 2008.

4.4.3 Economic Effects

South Africa had really become an employment haven for Zimbabweans as explained by the brain drain plague, leading ChimaniKire (2005) to claim that the brain drain was indeed a brain gain for South Africa.

The table indicates that most of the respondents strongly sided with the claim that the influx of Zimbabwean ‘refugees’ into South Africa had major economic effects. Additionally, 15 respondents further supported the proposition. The proposition was supported mostly by government officials, embassy officials, and members of the academia. By 2009, an estimated 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans had filtered into South Africa (Nyanga et al: 2012). This figure was also inclusive of members of the academia and other professionals.

According to one Ministry of Trade and Economic development official, “South Africa has a giant economy that grew significantly during the past decades, obviously buoyed by cheap immigrant labour mainly made up of Zimbabweans”. The country managed to construct massive infrastructure in the run up to the 2010 FIFA World Cup aided by labour from the many ordinary and technical Zimbabweans who sought economic refugee in the country. Hosting of an event of this magnitude had enormous positive contributions to its economy, an assertion that was admitted to even by the civic society and other key informants. This was directly attributable to the readily available cheap labour that the country received from Zimbabwe. In support, the Central Statistics
Office (2008) indicated that Zimbabwe was losing around 4000 nurses annually since the beginning of the millennium. Many of these nurses made home in South Africa where they were offered better remuneration.

On the contrary, 11 respondents disagreed with the proposition that South Africa economically benefitted from the human movement from Zimbabwe. Some academics and Embassy officials were of the opinion that South Africa was actually the one that suffered economically as a result of the influx of Zimbabwean ‘refugees’ into its land. This was attributable to the fact that the country committed significant financial resources in trying to police the foreigners, whilst at the same time trying to make sure that these people were looked after and had access to social amenities like hospitals and schools. This in itself implied that the country had to dig deeper into its purse. Supporting the assertion, Home Affairs Minister Buthelezi way back in 1997 even remarked that ‘illegal aliens’ were costing South African taxpayers ‘billions of rands’ each year (Culbertson: 2006). Such an assertion holds true by president Zuma’s own admission in 2009 that there were around 3-4 million Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa (Chimanikire DP: 2005). Many of these migrants were actually refugees in holding camps, whose welfare was purely a government responsibility.

4.5 Responses on the issue of Xenophobia

**Figure 2**

The above graph indicates that 59% of the respondents, especially key informants like cross border traders and other fortune seekers like academics were victims of xenophobia. Xenophobia did not only occur in the form of physical attacks, but was also perpetrated arbitrarily in the form of xenophobic sentiments or xenophobic treatment. Usually, xenophobia ensued at the border post.
with South African immigration officials harassing Zimbabwean immigrants entering South Africa accusing them of flooding their country. This ranged from the use of derogatory terms to describe Zimbabweans to utter disrespect whilst serving them. The SAPS would even go to the extent of demanding for bribes known as the ‘rite of passage’ (Culbertson: 2006). ChimaniKire (2005) further bemoans the case of a Zimbabwean man who described how staff at a refugee centre demanded bribes from queuing Zimbabweans and routinely whipped those who were seeking asylum.

On the other hand, 41% of the respondents indicated that they had not in any way been subjected to acts of xenophobia. This, according to the civic society could be attributable to the fact that some of these respondents were a learned lot who did not normally travel on public transport, but used air or private vehicles. Normally, those perpetrating xenophobic attacks at the border post targeted individuals travelling in public vehicles as they underwent their immigration formalities.

To others like the cross border traders, xenophobia could have been perpetrated on them but could not precisely link it to xenophobia since they perceived xenophobia to be only a physical phenomenon. Physical xenophobic attacks in their extreme resulted in the death or injury of the victims like what happened in Alexandra Park in 2008 where 62 people died and more than 100 000 were displaced (Buchholz: 2008). Those that were displaced lost all the property that they had acquired whilst in South Africa as the perpetrators looted and ransacked the victims’ homes and properties alike (Reitzes: 2009). The attacks even led to dozens of women being raped as supported by (Misago, Landau and Monson: 2009; Lefko-Everett: 2008). The type of xenophobic attacks carried out at the border post and refugee camps resulted in people losing their money and other belongings to their perpetrators. This even went to the extent of lowering the victims’ self esteem byre constantly being belittled by people who were not even of a high societal standing.

4.5 South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwe crisis

**Table 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 above shows the respondents’ views over South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwe crisis.
Respondents mainly from the Embassy and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs opined that the way South Africa handled the Zimbabwe situation was very good. Another respondent from the academia felt that by adopting quiet diplomacy, they believed South Africa adopted the ideals of a good neighbour. The same sentiment was also echoed by Graham (2006). South Africa never strayed from the African brotherhood belief and stood firm by Zimbabwe in the face of serious attacks by the West.

Another respondent from the Ministry of Trade and Economic Development further noted that South Africa even offered Zimbabwe financial and political support until a solution to the crisis was found. This low distribution of opinion stemmed from the fact that most people especially the civic society expected South Africa to descend heavily on Zimbabwe in a bid to finding a lasting solution to the crisis. An Embassy official attributed South Africa’s surprising move to its quest to shake off its apartheid history and also the lessons that it learnt from the Nigeria, Lesotho and DRC crises. South Africa therefore neither wanted to continue being labelled a regional nor a continental bully. This resonates well with McKinley (2006) who pointed out that the ANC therefore argued that a tougher stance on Zimbabwe would only serve to exacerbate the crisis, rather than solve it. However, this move was viewed by some as realism since South Africa had interests in Zimbabwe. Its adoption of quiet diplomacy was therefore seen as inappropriate and only served realistic purposes as opposed to idealism.

Sixteen respondents thought that South Africa’s handling of the situation was commendable. Since Zimbabwe literally relied on South Africa for sustenance, it was South Africa’s responsibility to ensure its neighbour’s survival. This it did by ensuring the continuous supply of fuel and electricity to Zimbabwe by Sasol and Eskom and also ensuring that food was available in Zimbabwean supermarkets. On its part, South Africa ‘welcomed’ Zimbabwean refugees in their times of need. As it proceeded with its quiet diplomacy, South Africa through president Mbeki managed to usher a breakthrough in Zimbabwean politics by brokering a peace deal which brought about the GNU. The GNU was not a total solution to Zimbabwe’s problems, but managed to bring in a semblance of normalcy.

Thirty four respondents indicated that South Africa handled the Zimbabwe situation in a poor way. The civic society and some key informants expected that as strong as South Africa was both militarily and economically, it was supposed to employ hard power strategies on Zimbabwe in order to bring a lasting solution. Lipton (2009) concurs that at least this is what the EU and the
USA and the general populace thought. However, its insistence on quiet diplomacy in the face of a worsening political scenario only served to make matters worse.

They further indicated that South Africa at regular intervals would announce a breakthrough in the Zimbabwe talks, only to be refuted by ZANU (PF). It therefore became apparent that quiet diplomacy had become ineffective and had to be dumped by the wayside, a view that was also supported by Graham (2006). This strategy only brought with it a partial solution, with the advent of the GNU that saw Zimbabwe’s three main political parties agree to a power sharing deal. However, the GNU was not as conclusive as ZANU (PF) continued to disregard what it had pledged to undertake, for example the Security Sector Reform and evening the political playing ground to allow for free and fair elections. This happened in the full glare of South Africa and SADC who acted as the guarantors of the global political pact committed to in letter and spirit. ZANU (PF) even went to the extent of unilaterally dissolving the GNU with South Africa acceding to this act.

4.7 Sincerity of South Africa’s quiet diplomacy in solving the Zimbabwe crisis

Figure 3

Chart 3 above shows respondents’ indications on South Africa’s sincerity in using quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe.
Most of the respondents expressed serious reservations on South Africa’s sincerity on Zimbabwe when it adopted quiet diplomacy. Academics and the civic society felt that South Africa displayed realist tendencies by prolonging Zimbabwe’s instability whilst it benefitted economically from its neighbour’s temporary paralysis. South Africa benefitted immensely from the Zimbabwe brain drain. This is noted by its formulation of a policy to give skilled Zimbabwean workers permanent residence (Lipton: 2009). Even the concomitant flood of unskilled labourers into South Africa tended both to undermine wage levels and services for low-paid and unemployed South Africans, while lowering the cost of unskilled labour for the economy overally.

Academics and cross border traders felt that by prolonging the Zimbabwe crisis, Zimbabwe would be forced into a state of permanent dependency on South Africa for its survival. Zimbabwe was seen as the only viable threat to South Africa within SADC, therefore its demise would ensure that South Africa remained at the top. This statement holds true as noted by Lipton (2009) whilst quoting the The Zimbabwean Newspaper headline which read ‘South Africa buys Zimbabwe: massive investment in food, beer, gold, oil, power, banking, agriculture.’ He further stated that, South Africa was pumping in massive capital to take control of key economic sectors. This is a true indication of covert realistic tendencies on the part of South Africa.

Further, to academics and the civic society, quiet diplomacy (negotiation) and financial prop ups to a government that was facing a legitimacy crisis was out of context. They argued that South Africa was supposed to offer only humanitarian assistance that would not be channelled through the government as this would ensure that the funds were not abused. This is supported by Freeman (2005) who noted that the Mbeki government moved in as early is 2000 to financially support the government of Zimbabwe. This was seen as a ploy by South Africa to safeguard its economic interests in the struggling Zimbabwe and not necessarily for humanitarian intervention. McKinley (2004) further gives credence to this claim by pointing out that the South African government bankrolled a R1 billion loan facility to Zimbabwe, which was then used to settle Zimbabwe’s debts with Sasol and Eskom. None of the funds were committed to humanitarian purposes. By so doing, under the guise of assisting a fellow government South Africa was actually serving its own interests in Zimbabwe.

Other academics questioned why the Mbeki as the Chief Mediator initially chose to align himself with ZANU (PF) at the expense of other parties. They argued that from the onset of the negotiations Mbeki showed thinly veiled bias towards ZANU (PF) when he excluded negotiators from other
parties from meeting him on his numerous trips to Harare. To them that was a sign that South Africa was negotiating in bad faith by aligning itself with a single party. It also showed that there was something fishy going on between the Chief Mediator and ZANU (PF). Since South Africa had interests in Zimbabwe that needed protection, the bias indicated a manifestation of realism by South Africa.

Some cross border traders even noted that South Africans had the tendency to drive off cross border traders and other immigrants whenever Zimbabwe moved towards an election. This they did in order to force ‘displaced’ Zimbabweans to participate in national elections that would result in a change of government, thereby ensuring that all immigrant Zimbabweans would go back home and left the South Africans alone. This, according to them proved that South Africa was not being sincere in trying to find a lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s problems.

Government and Embassy officials felt that South Africa did its best. They argued that South Africa and Zimbabwe shared a similar colonial and political history. This argument was also supported by Mills and Prins (2008). Zimbabwe was further instrumental in the latter’s attainment of independence in 1994. As one of the Frontline States leaders, President Mugabe was at the forefront of demonizing the apartheid regime. He also offered political and material support to ANC and SACP leaders as they fought against apartheid. They pointed out that some ANC officials were housed in Harare for strategic reasons, a notion that was also pointed out by Kalley (1986). Therefore, it was inappropriate for South Africa to adopt a tough stance on Zimbabwe. They further advanced that a negotiated solution always cements good relations as opposed to a forceful solution. In this case Zimbabwe needed South Africa in the same way South Africa needed Zimbabwe as Mbeki (2002) pointed out. Had South Africa opted for the use of force in Zimbabwe, it would therefore have found it difficult to shrug off its bad boy image that it acquired during apartheid.

An official from the South African Embassy noted that by adopting quiet diplomacy, South Africa stood by one of its main foreign policy principles stating that South Africa strongly advocates the use of non-violence and diplomacy to resolve interstate disputes, rather than armed force or even measures such as sanctions. This statement also resonates well with what Mbeki (2002) unequivocally stated whilst defending his soft stance on Zimbabwe. By not adopting tough measures as advocated for by the West, South Africa showed a bold stance by resisting racism and Western imperialism that would have been tantamount to the recolonisation of Africa.
Some academics also felt that South Africa behaved as a good African brother by upholding Zimbabwe’s sovereignty. This is supported by Ndlovu-Gatsheni’s (2011) argument that Mbeki’s stance on Zimbabwe, on behalf of South Africa, SADC and the AU, in defence of Zimbabwe’s sovereignty was a patriotic duty. Hamill & Hoffman (2009) further upheld this notion by observing that any interference in Zimbabwe’s domestic policies would have contravened Zimbabwe’s sovereignty and deny it its status as maintained by the UN Charter Article 2(4), which states that “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations”.

Another member from the Foreign Affairs office indicated that Mbeki was part of a troika meeting consisting of Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and Australian Prime Minister John Howard that was created by the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) to look into the 2002 allegations of vote rigging in the Zimbabwe presidential election. This meeting recommended the suspension of Zimbabwe from the decision-making councils of the Commonwealth for one year. He however stated that Mbeki was never satisfied with the decision on Zimbabwe. This is supported by Graham’s (2006) assertion that Mbeki strongly opposed another 2003 CHOGM resolution to continue with the suspension of Zimbabwe.

An Embassy official also advanced that it was the same President Mbeki who came to Zimbabwe’s rescue after the 2005 Tabajuka report on Operation Murambatsvina, which alleged gross human rights violations when Zimbabwe rid the towns and cities of slums, thereby leaving thousands homeless in the process. Mbeki questioned why Western leaders were so concerned about Zimbabwe while not paying the same amount of attention to far more dire African emergencies, such as civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

4.8 Effectiveness of Quiet Diplomacy as a Conflict Resolution tool in Zimbabwe
Figure 4

Chart 4 above shows the respondents’ recommendations on the effectiveness of South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool in Zimbabwe.

The majority of the respondents, especially the civic society felt that quiet diplomacy was not effective as a conflict resolution tool in Zimbabwe. They opined that it took long to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe. The length of time that it took to resolve the crisis meant that the Zimbabwean people suffered unnecessarily over a long period of time. They argued that by negotiating with a repressive government, South Africa was in fact buying more time for the Harare government by giving it a sense of accommodation. This then led to the continued repression of ordinary Zimbabweans. In a situation where elections have been allegedly successively ‘stolen’, i.e. in 2002, 2005 and 2008, it does not make sense to negotiate with and ultimately allow the loser to retain a controlling stake in government. Moreso, they noted that political polarization still existed in Zimbabwe even at the time of going to elections.

However, 20% felt that quiet diplomacy showed maturity on the part of the chief negotiator as it sought to resolve the conflict peacefully. They argued that forceful resolutions did not ensure lasting peace as is the case in Iraq and Libya. The moment a government is toppled by force, sectarian violence then occurs and is difficult to stop, and may plunge the nation into civil war.

Respondents like government officials and academics felt that quiet diplomacy was to be commended for bringing in peace and stability in Zimbabwe. They cited the formation of the GNU as an example of the effectiveness of quiet diplomacy. When the GNU became operational, Zimbabwe started exhibiting signs of normalization especially on the economic front which had suffered immensely due to the prolonged crisis. Others cited the multi-currency regime that came
with the GNU. The adoption of a host of foreign currencies like the US dollar and the South African rand managed to stabilize the economy and controlled the runaway inflation that had reduced the Zimbabwean dollar to nothing.

To others the GNU was responsible for the peace that prevailed in the country with political leaders of the three political parties sharing power publicly calling for peace. This peace endured into the 2013 harmonized elections that eventually brought a single party into power.

4.9 Summary

The data gathered from the research process was presented in the form of graphs, tables, and charts. These were further augmented by discussions and analyses that emanated from both the researcher and other secondary sources. Basically, the research found out that the Zimbabwe crisis, which was mediated by South Africa via quiet diplomacy, had devastating effects on Zimbabwe such as brain drain. The movement of people into South Africa was also found to have political, social, and economic implications as the increased numbers put a strain on the economy and social amenities of South Africa, resulting in a political backlash for Mbeki. It was also revealed that Zimbabwean immigrants were exposed to xenophobic sentiments and attacks from South Africans whilst seeking redemption there. The research indicated that South Africa had realist manifestations over its use of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe. Furthermore, the findings show that quiet diplomacy failed to achieve its major objective, finding a lasting solution to the Zimbabwe crisis.
CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

5.0 Introduction

This chapter summarises the research work. The researcher makes a conclusion from the data gathered as well as offering recommendations.

5.1 Summary

Secondary sources such as Zikhali (2008), Kinsey (1999), Sachikonye (2003/2008) Mlambo and Raftopoulos (2010), Moss (2007), Mashingaidze (2006) and others are all synonymous that the Zimbabwe crisis was ignited by a host of events that took place in the late eighties to early 2000. These ranged from ESAP, payment of gratuities to war veterans, the participation in the DRC war to the FTLRP. All these scenarios were further compounded by the political crisis that emerged in 1999 with the emergency of the MDC to challenge ZANU (PF)’s political hegemony. This has in turn poisoned Zimbabwe’s political environment as ZANU (PF) sought to maintain power at all costs. South Africa has had limited influence in trying to resolve this conflict.

The study aimed to explore the reasons behind South Africa’s continued use of quiet diplomacy in Zimbabwe and the impact this strategy had on both nations. South Africa and Zimbabwe are conjoined by historical ties - the history of the two nations’ liberation struggles in general and the relations between Mbeki’s ANC and Mugabe’s ZANU-PF in particular (Kagwanja: 2006). The historical connections between Mbeki and Mugabe are equally important. While in exile in the 1980s, Mbeki was hosted by Mugabe in Zimbabwe (Gevisser 2007). Therefore, according to Mbeki, South Africa would not abandon its neighbour in their hour of need. Quiet diplomacy was therefore seen as a befitting payback to the Harare government.

It was also discovered that though South Africa was being honest in is mediation efforts, it also harboured ulterior motives of a realist nature. Although there were costs to South Africa’s adoption of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe, the benefits clearly outweighed the costs. South Africa had significant economic interests in Zimbabwe which required safeguarding. These ranged from
mining, energy, to the provision of basic goods. Therefore South Africa had no option but to prop up the Harare government and ensure the protection of those interests.

Again, instead of being continuously regarded as a regional bully reminiscent of the apartheid regime, South Africa managed to shake off its bad boy image of bullying other states. Therefore a soft stance on Zimbabwe was used as a means to achieve an end.

Moreover, President Mugabe is admired by the whole of Africa; publicly admonishing him was likely to attract the wrath of other African nation leaders. Therefore, quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe was a well calculated foreign policy strategy by South Africa enabling it to sell the NEPAD and African Renaissance idea.

Apart from having to cope with the influx of economic migrants from Zimbabwe, South Africa quickly exploited the situation to its own advantage. Instead of regarding Zimbabwean migrants as a burden, it took that as an opportunity to boost both its skilled and unskilled workforce. The unskilled workforce was handy in 2010 when South Africa hosted the FIFA World Cup soccer extravaganza. As a result, Zimbabwe incurred quite a significant economic loss.

The impact of South Africa’s strategy on Zimbabwe was that there was prolonged suffering for the ordinary Zimbabweans who ended up resorting to cross border trading. Others migrated altogether into other countries. This migration was not taken simply by the ordinary South African nationals who viewed the foreigners as both social and economical threats. There was increased competition for scarce jobs between ordinary South Africans and migrants Zimbabweans. This scenario then degenerated into xenophobic attacks that were perpetrated against Zimbabweans in 2008. The research also held the assumption that South Africa adopted quiet diplomacy because it did not want to antagonize a neighbour since South Africa stood to benefit very much economically from the Zimbabwean problem. Zimbabwe would in the near future not challenge South Africa’s economic hegemony in the Southern African region and would therefore only continue to flourish at the mercy of South Africa.

This is plausible given the stance that South Africa adopted from the onset of Zimbabwe’s woes. Quiet diplomacy entailed that South Africa maintained good relations with the Harare government. Negotiations were underway but had a delayed outcome. This stance ensured that South Africa would benefit economically from Zimbabwe’s stagnation. Zimbabwe’s industrial slowdown
proved to be a blessing for South African industry which enjoyed brisk business from Zimbabwe as a result. The unprecedented labour migration that ensued thereafter as noted by ZIMSTATS shows how South Africa benefitted from Zimbabwe’s brain drain, which Chimikire (2005) later dubbed as South Africa’s brain gain.

By not adopting a harsher stance, South Africa has quietly benefitted from Zimbabwe’s instability whilst purporting to be assisting. South Africa’s behaviour had realist connotations as it appeared intent on safeguarding its own economic interests in Zimbabwe by continuously supporting the Harare government at international and regional fora and also providing financial support. This therefore ensured that South Africa enjoyed unfettered hegemony over Southern Africa as a result of its neighbour’s temporary paralysis. Zimbabwe can only rebuild its economy at the mercy of South Africa and the chances of it catching up with or overtaking South Africa are very slim.

Though the research was qualitative in nature, it utilized the triangulation approach. This entailed using more than one approach to investigate a research question, in the process enhancing confidence in the findings. Therefore quantitative research was also employed in some instances in order to counter on the limitations of the qualitative approach. The target population were the entire citizens of both Zimbabwe and South Africa. However, because of logistical challenges, convenience sampling was used to select respondents. The respondents were drawn from the South African Embassy, Ministries of Trade and Economic Development and also Foreign Affairs, members of the Faculty of Commerce and the Faculty of Sciences and Humanities from BUSE, and from the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the UZ. The Civic associations consisted of the CZC, ZCTU, CCJP and ZESN. As part of triangulation the research gathered data using questionnaires, interviews, and from secondary sources. These were all employed alternately.

All in all, it was agreed that South Africa’s quiet diplomacy strategy failed to achieve a lasting solution to Zimbabwe’s crisis. Apart from the GNU and the introduction of the multicurrency regime, the strategy did not bear anything meaningful. The GNU was simply a marriage of convenience amongst the three political parties as they bickered continuously. ZANU (PF) retained and lot of sway in the power sharing arrangement and it continued to bully and frustrate the other partners. It even went to the extent of unilaterally dissolving the pact and declared harmonized elections in 2013.

5.2 Conclusion
The study concluded that South Africa’s use of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe was a failure. This was so because South Africa’s position from the onset as a mediator was compromised by realistic tendencies which manifested themselves through President Mbeki’s thinly veiled bias in favour of ZANU (PF). Pretoria’s bias stemmed from the fact that it stood to benefit a lot from aligning itself with ZANU (PF) as opposed to other parties. There were issues to do with historical ties and economical interests. These interests formed part of South Africa’s ulterior motives. This strategy was also used to ensure Zimbabwe’s slow economic growth at the mercy of South Africa.

On the other hand, the issue of sovereignty was a major setback as it prescribed the line for South Africa’s mediation efforts.

The GNU that was borne as a result of South Africa’s mediation effort did little to guarantee a legitimate election as it produced another election with a contested outcome in 2013.

There was a serious economic and social impact on the prolonged negotiations championed by South Africa. Zimbabwe lost quite a lot via brain drain and other vices associated with instability. There was no joy either for Zimbabwean migrants as they came face to face with angry South Africans who accused them of competing for jobs with them and stealing from them. This gave rise to xenophobic attacks on Zimbabweans with a significant loss of life and displacements.

5.3 Recommendations

It is therefore recommended that:

- The UN/AU/SADC be heavily involved in mediation processes rather than leave it to an individual country which would only update it on progress made. These bodies should have the power to remove negotiators who show signs of incompetence.

- There is need to carefully assess the gravity of the situation at hand before coming out with a conflict resolution strategy. Mediators should be cognizant of the fact that their actions have humanitarian consequences on the civilian population of the affected country. Therefore, their dealings should be in the interests of those people and peace deals be concluded in the shortest time possible.
The issue of impartiality should be upheld when mediating in conflicts that involve different parties. Most of the stalemates and hiccups that Mbeki encountered in his mediation efforts were a consequence of his soft spot for ZANU (PF) and the quest for the preservation of personal and economic interests.

5.4 Areas for further studies

Further studies can be undertaken in areas of strengthening global, continental, or regional bodies’ capacities to undertake effective conflict resolution.

5.5 Conclusion

The chapter revealed consensus by various authors that Zimbabwe’s crisis started in the 1990s mainly as a result of economic mismanagement, followed by the FTLRP, sanctions and the political instability that ensued at the beginning of the millennium. It was also established that South Africa’s quiet diplomacy did not adequately address the Zimbabwean crisis though it must be commended for brokering a power sharing deal that saw stability returning to Zimbabwe, anchored by the multicurrency regime. The power sharing deal was however, not conclusive enough as it failed to guarantee an election without a contested outcome. Though South Africa showed realist tendencies in its negotiations, it was also seen that the issue of sovereignty actually handicapped South Africa’s ability to find a lasting solution. The brain drain that occurred and the xenophobic attacks that ensued in 2008 were all consequences of South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis. It was therefore recommended that bodies like the UN/AU/SADC be heavily involved in mediation issues and should also ensure impartiality on the part of the mediator.
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LIST OF ANNEXES

House Number 2665
Aerodrome
BINDURA

1 September 2014

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Dear Sir/Madam

INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SURVEY

My name is ALLAN RICKY GWATA. I am an MSc International Relations student with Bindura University of Science Education currently carrying out a study in partial fulfillment of the postgraduate programme. The title of the thesis reads: “Intra African Relations: An Analysis of Motive and Impact of South Africa’s Quiet Diplomacy on Zimbabwe. A Case Study of the year 2000 to 2013”.

I am therefore kindly appealing to you to participate in this study by completing the questionnaire attached. Your responses will be treated in strict confidence and will only be used for the sole purpose of this study. No personal names will be used therefore, please feel free to answer to the best of your ability.

I thank you in advance, for participating in this study.

Yours faithfully

____________________
ALLAN RICKY GWATA
B1025286
**TOPIC**

**INTRA AFRICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF MOTIVE AND IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S QUIET DIPLOMACY ON ZIMBABWE. A CASE STUDY OF THE YEAR 2000 TO 2013**

Please indicate your choice of response by ticking in the appropriate box. You are also kindly requested to give explanations where necessary.

**SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS**

1. **GENDER**
   - Male [ ]
   - Female [ ]

2. **AGE**
   - 18 – 25 years [ ]
   - 26 – 30 years [ ]
   - 31 – 35 years [ ]
   - 36 – 40 years [ ]
   - 41 – 45 years [ ]
   - 46 – 50 years [ ]
   - 51 + years [ ]

3. **CATEGORY**
   - Embassy Official [ ]
   - Government/Ministry Official [ ]
   - Civic Society Official [ ]
   - Member of the Academia [ ]
SECTION B

4. Were you already serving as a government/embassy/civic society official or member of the academia during the years 2000 to 2013 when Zimbabwe was facing a political and economic crisis?

(a) Yes 
(b) No

5. In your own opinion, which of the following variables could have caused the crisis?

(a) Political Instability
(b) Fast Track Land Reform Exercise
(c) Targeted Sanctions
(d) Other

6. If your answer to question 5 was ‘other’, please explain further.

____________________________________________________________________
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7. Indicate by means of a tick in the table below what you think were the reasons for South Africa’s adoption of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe. (The letters stand for (SA) Strongly Agree, (A) Agree, (U) Undecided, (D) Disagree and (SD) Strongly Disagree respectively).

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8. Indicate by means of a tick in the table below the extent to which human migration from Zimbabwe had on South Africa.

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<td>c Economic effects</td>
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9. Have you ever been a victim of xenophobic attacks?

(a) Yes

(b) No

10. How would you rate South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwe situation during the period 2000 to 2013?

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<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
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11. Please explain your choice in question 10.

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12. By adopting the use of ‘quiet diplomacy’ whilst dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe, do you think South Africa had an ulterior motive?

(a) Yes

(b) No
13. Do you think the use of quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool on Zimbabwe was effective?

   (a) Yes  

   (b) No  

14. Please explain your answer.

   ___________________________________________________________________
   ___________________________________________________________________
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THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING.
TOPIC

INTRA AFRICAN RELATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF MOTIVE AND IMPACT OF SOUTH AFRICA’S QUIET DIPLOMACY ON ZIMBABWE. A CASE STUDY OF THE YEAR 2000 TO 2013

Please indicate your choice of response by ticking in the appropriate box. You are also kindly requested to give explanations where necessary.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DETAILS

1. GENDER
   - Male
   - Female

2. AGE
   - 18 – 25 years
   - 26 – 30 years
   - 31 – 35 years
   - 36 – 40 years
   - 41 – 45 years
   - 46 – 50 years
   - 51 + years

SECTION B

3. Were you formally employed between the years 2000 to 2013 when Zimbabwe was facing a political and economic crisis?
   - (c) Yes
   - (d) No

4. If your answer to question 3 is ‘Yes’, did you at any time quit/lose your employment during the above-stated period?
(e) Yes  
(f) No

5. In your own opinion, which of the following variables could have caused the crisis?

(g) Political Instability  
(h) Fast Track Land Reform Exercise  
(i) Targeted Sanctions  
(j) Other

6. If your answer to question 5 was ‘other’, please explain further.
________________________________________________________________________
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7. Indicate by means of a tick in the table below what you think were the reasons for South Africa’s adoption of quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe. (The letters stand for (SA) Strongly Agree, (A) Agree, (U) Undecided, (D) Disagree and (SD) Strongly Disagree respectively).

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<td>c South Africa’s early conflict resolution</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>d Realism</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. Indicate by means of a tick in the table below the extent to which human migration from Zimbabwe had on South Africa.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>U</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>SD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a Political effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b Social effects</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c Economic effects</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9. Have you ever been a victim of xenophobic attacks?

(c) Yes  
(d) No

10. How would you rate South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwe situation during the period 2000 to 2013?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Excellent</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Average</th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Very Poor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11. Please explain your choice in question 10.

_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________________________

12. By adopting the use of ‘quiet diplomacy’ whilst dealing with the crisis in Zimbabwe, do you think South Africa had an ulterior motive?

(c) Yes  
(d) No
13. Do you think the use of quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool on Zimbabwe was effective?

(c) Yes
(d) No

14. Please explain your answer.

________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________

THANK YOU FOR RESPONDING.
INTERVIEW GUIDE


1. Have you ever been formally employed between the years 2000 to 2013 when Zimbabwe was facing a political and economic crisis?

2. Did you at any time quit/lose your employment during the above-stated period?

3. State the factors that could have contributed to the Zimbabwean crisis.

4. What do you think were South Africa’s reasons for adopting quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe?

5. Do you agree that human immigration into South Africa had the following effects:

   (i) Political
   (ii) Social
   (iii) Economic

6. Have you ever been a victim of xenophobic attacks?

7. How would you rate South Africa’s handling of the Zimbabwean crisis during the period 2000 to 2013?

8. Do you think South Africa had an ulterior motive by adopting quiet diplomacy on Zimbabwe?

9. Do you think the use of quiet diplomacy as a conflict resolution tool on Zimbabwe was effective?